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Congress, the Constitution, and 
Supreme Court Recusal 
Louis J. Virelli III* 
Abstract 
Recusal is one of the most hotly contested issues facing the 
Supreme Court. From the wide-ranging debate over Supreme 
Court recusal, however, a singular theme has emerged: Congress 
must do more to protect the integrity and legitimacy of the Court 
by regulating the Justices’ recusal practices. Herein lies the 
problem. Rather than solve the puzzle of Supreme Court recusal, 
direct congressional regulation has created an impasse between 
Congress and the Court that has consequences for the reputation, 
efficacy, and legitimacy of both Branches. In a precursor to this 
Article, I recast the issue of Supreme Court recusal as a 
constitutional question and argued that direct congressional 
regulation of Supreme Court recusal violates the separation of 
powers. This Article builds on that prior work and argues that 
separation of powers principles are critical to understanding and 
alleviating the inter-branch impasse over recusal. It contends that 
Congress, rather than the Court, should take the lead in resolving 
that impasse and that the separation of powers requires Congress 
to use indirect constitutional mechanisms to do so. Specifically, 
Congress should repeal the current statutory provision directly 
regulating Supreme Court recusal and focus instead on more 
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indirect constitutional tools—such as impeachment, procedural 
reform, judicial confirmation, appropriations, and investigation—
to influence the Justices’ recusal practices. This effort to frame the 
recusal debate within its proper constitutional context permits a 
more robust and productive dialogue about both the Justices’ 
recusal practices as well as the broader question of the nature and 
dynamics of inter-branch relations in our tripartite government. 
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I. Introduction 
Supreme Court recusal1—the question of whether an 
individual Justice may participate in a case—is currently among 
the most high profile and controversial issues involving the 
Court.2 Chief Justice Roberts’s 2011 Year-End Report on the 
Federal Judiciary (“Year End Report”) focused entirely on 
Supreme Court ethics and recusal,3 and was immediately met 
with sharp criticism by legislators and commentators.4 Sitting 
                                                                                                     
 1. As has become common practice in discussions about the 
disqualification of judges, the term recusal in this instance will be used 
interchangeably to include both the terms “disqualification,” which traditionally 
refers to involuntary removal of a judge from a case, and “recusal,” which is 
generally limited to a judge’s voluntary decision to withdraw from a case. See 
RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION 
OF JUDGES § 1.1, at 4 (Banks & Jordan, 2d ed. 2007) (“In fact, in modern practice 
‘disqualification’ and ‘recusal’ are frequently viewed as synonymous, and 
employed interchangeably.”). 
 2. See Letter from 138 Law Professors to the House & Senate Judiciary 
Comms., Changing Ethical and Recusal Rules for Supreme Court Justices  (Mar. 
17, 2011) [hereinafter Law Professor Letter], available at http:// 
www.afj.org/judicial_ethics_sign_on_letter.pdf (calling for congressional reform 
of Supreme Court ethical and recusal standards, and explaining that “[r]ecent 
media reports have focused public attention” on the issue). 
 3. See CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2011 YEAR-END REPORT ON 
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2011) [hereinafter 2011 YEAR-END REPORT], available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2011year-endreport.pdf. 
 4. See Letter from Five Senators to Chief Justice Roberts (Feb. 13, 2012) 
[hereinafter Senator Letter], available at http://www.afj.org/connect-with-the-
issues/supreme-court-ethics-reform/letter-to-supreme-court-2-13-12.pdf (asking 
the Court to formally adopt the ethical and recusal requirements in the Judicial 
Conference of the United States Code of Conduct for United States Judges); 
Howard Bashman, A Way Forward on Judicial Ethics, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 
2012, at A20 (“[A]n alliance of government watchdog groups delivered 100,000 
signatures to the Supreme Court . . . calling on the justices to voluntarily . . . 
reform how they handle requests for recusals.”); Sherrilyn Ifill, The Chief 
Strikes Out, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Jan. 4, 2012, 12:14 PM), 
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2012/01/sherrilyn-ifills-the-chief-
strikes-out.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2012) [hereinafter Ifill, The Chief Strikes 
Out] (“Justice Roberts has not yet made the case for why the Supreme Court 
should be exempt from the same ethics and recusal standards that govern [other 
federal] judges.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); William 
Yeomans & Herman Schwartz, Roberts to America: Trust Us, POLITICO.COM 
(Jan. 24, 2012, 10:26 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0112/71895.html 
(last visited Sept. 18, 2012) (arguing that declining to explain recusal decisions 
“denies the American people their right to know whether the justices are doing 
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Justices were called to testify before Congress twice in the past 
year about recusal issues,5 and more than 135 law professors 
signed a letter to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees in 
March of 2011 outlining the need for new recusal legislation to 
“protect the integrity of the Supreme Court.”6 That letter led to 
the introduction of a bill in the House of Representatives that 
would establish new substantive and procedural recusal 
standards for the Court.7 The Justices’ individual conduct has 
also been the subject of recent criticism,8 including a heated 
                                                                                                     
their job as they should”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 5. Justices Breyer and Kennedy were asked about Supreme Court ethics 
and recusal standards as part of their testimony before a House subcommittee 
on April 14, 2011. See Eileen Malloy, Supreme Court Justices Already Comply 
with Ethics Rules, Kennedy, Breyer Say, 79 U.S. L. WK. 2389, 2389 (2011). On 
October 5, 2011, Justices Breyer and Scalia testified on a similar topic before 
the Senate Judiciary Committee. See Considering the Role of Judges under the 
Constitution of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
112th Cong. 4–41 (2011). 
 6. Law Professor Letter, supra note 2, at 1. 
 7. See Supreme Court Transparency Disclosure Act of 2011, H.R. 862, 
112th Cong. (2011). 
 8. Justices Samuel Alito, Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Antonin 
Scalia, Sonia Sotomayor, and Clarence Thomas have all recently been criticized 
for their interactions with politically interested entities that either have been or 
are likely to come before the Court. Justices Scalia and Thomas were criticized 
for attending Federalist Society fundraisers and dinners sponsored by the 
conservative Koch brothers on the basis that ties to politically active 
organizations could negatively impact their ability to remain impartial in future 
cases. See Nan Aron, An Ethics Code for the High Court, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 
2011, at A19; Nina Totenberg, Bill Puts Ethics Spotlight on Supreme Court 
Justices, NPR (Aug. 17, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/08/17/139646573/bill-
puts-ethics-spotlight-on-supreme-court-justices (last visited Sept. 18, 2012) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Yeomans & Schwartz, supra 
note 4 (demanding a “reasoned explanation . . . of the propriety of the recent 
decision by Justices Clarence Thomas and Scalia to headline a fundraiser for the 
Federalist Society”). Justice Thomas was similarly critiqued for his relationship 
with a wealthy conservative contributor who allegedly provided funding for 
projects of interest to the Justice and his wife. See Mike McIntire, The Justice 
and the Magnate, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2011, at A1. Justice Alito has drawn 
scrutiny for his attendance at fundraising dinners for the conservative American 
Spectator magazine. See Yeomans & Schwartz, supra note 4. Justices Breyer, 
Ginsburg, and Sotomayor were singled out for having accepted paid trips from 
organizations with political viewpoints. See The Justices’ Junkets, WASH. POST, 
Feb. 21, 2011, at A14 (noting that Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor 
accepted trips paid for by the American Bar Association, the American 
Sociological Association, and the American Civil Liberties Union, respectively). 
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public debate over Justices Elena Kagan and Clarence Thomas’s 
participation in the Court’s review of the controversial Affordable 
Care Act.9 Finally, exhaustive coverage in the news media and 
legal academy has made recusal an unavoidable part of any 
modern discussion of the Court.10 
                                                                                                     
 9. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 
Stat. 119 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C); Eric Segall & 
Sherrilyn Ifill, Debate, Judicial Recusal at the Court, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 
PENNUMBRA 131 (2012); Arlen Specter, Judging the Justices Over Conflicts of 
Interest, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 2012, at A17. Even before the Court agreed to 
take the case, National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. 
Ct. 2566 (2012), Justices Kagan and Thomas were publicly encouraged to recuse 
themselves. Senator Orrin Hatch stated publicly that Justice Kagan should 
recuse herself because “he is sure that Kagan participated in discussions about 
the law and challenges to it while she served in the Justice Department as 
[Solicitor General].” Mark Sherman, Sen. Hatch: Kagan Should Sit Out Health 
Care Case, USA TODAY (Feb. 4, 2011, 3:49 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/ 
news/topstories/2011-02-04-3661380121_x.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2012) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Around the same time, seventy-
four House Democrats sent a letter to Justice Thomas asking him to recuse 
himself from the case “because of his wife’s ties to a lobbying group that opposes 
the health care law.” Huma Khan, Should Supreme Court Justices Clarence 
Thomas, Elena Kagan Sit Out Health Care Case?, ABCNEWS (Feb. 10, 2011), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/supreme-court-justice-clarence-thomas-sit-health-
care/story?id=12878346 (last visited Sept. 18, 2012) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 10. In addition to those cited above, several prominent media outlets 
carried pieces addressing Supreme Court recusal in 2011 and 2012. See, e.g., 
John Gibeaut, Sitting This One Out, ABA J., Mar. 2012, at 18 (noting that “the 
debate” regarding recusal law “will likely continue”); Joan Biskupic, Calls for 
Recusal Intensify in Health Care Case, USA TODAY, Nov. 21, 2011, at 6A 
(discussing the calls for Justices Thomas and Kagan to recuse themselves from 
hearing challenges to the Affordable Care Act); Editorial, Cloud over the Court, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2011, at A26 (addressing an alleged conflict of interest 
between Justice Thomas and a Dallas real estate magnate); Michael B. 
Mukasey, The ObamaCare Recusal Nonsense, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 2011, at A17 
(relating recent calls for recusal to the political process of appointing and 
confirming judges); Editorial, Supreme Court: The Recusal Question, L.A. TIMES, 
Jan. 3, 2012, at A14 (arguing that “the public deserves an explanation” when a 
Supreme Court Justice complies with or rejects a request to recuse); David 
Jackson, Obama Health Care Politics Hits High Court, USA TODAY (Nov. 15, 
2011 4:03 PM), http://content.usatoday.com/communities/theoval/post/2011/11/ 
obama-health-care-politics-hits-high-court/1 (last visited Sept. 18, 2012) 
(discussing letters written to Justices Thomas and Kagan, calling for their 
recusal in the case challenging the Affordable Care Act) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); Dahlia Lithwick, Ethics Are for Other People, 
SLATE.COM (Apr. 15, 2011 6:34 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_ 
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Unfortunately, this intense focus on Supreme Court recusal 
largely misses the point. By exclusively treating recusal as a 
question of judicial ethics, commentators and legislators have 
overlooked the fundamental constitutional questions that 
ultimately drive the ongoing conflict between Congress and the 
Court over the Justices’ recusal practices. This Article is the 
second installment in a project designed to address that oversight 
by recasting Supreme Court recusal as a constitutional 
separation of powers issue. The precursor to this Article argued 
that the separation of powers constitutionally precludes Congress 
from creating legally binding recusal standards for the Justices—
what I will refer to here as direct regulation of Supreme Court 
recusal decisions.11 This Article uses separation of powers 
principles to move past the identification of constitutional issues 
                                                                                                     
politics/jurisprudence/2011/04/ethics_are_for_other_people.html (last visited 
Sept. 18, 2012) (arguing that “[i]ndividual judges, faced with questions of 
compromising judicial conduct, are in the worst possible position to judge 
themselves) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Eric J. Segall, 
An Ominous Silence on the Supreme Court, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2012), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/12/opinion/la-oe-segall-kagan-recusal-20120 
212 (last visited Sept. 18, 2012) (discussing calls for recusal of Justices in the 
case challenging the Affordable Care Act) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review); Tevi Troy, Health Care Recusal Is the Judges’ Call, POLITICO.COM 
(Nov. 22, 2011, 9:24 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/ 1111/68943.html 
(last visited Sept. 18, 2012) (discussing Justices’ recusal in the case challenging 
the Affordable Care Act) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); 
Rick Ungar, Scalia and Thomas Party with Obamacare Challengers on Day 
Court Takes Up Case, FORBES (Nov. 15, 2011, 11:57 PM), http://www. 
forbes.com/sites/rickungar/2011/11/15/scalia-and-thomas-party-with-healthcare-
opponents-on-day-court-takes-up-healthcare-challenge/ (last visited Sept. 18, 
2012) (discussing the ethics of the Justices and the case challenging the 
Affordable Care Act) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Russell 
Wheeler, What’s So Hard about Regulating Supreme Court Justices’ Ethics?—A 
Lot, BROOKINGS INST. (Nov. 30, 2011), http://www.brookings.edu/research/ 
papers/2011/11/28-courts-wheeler (last visited Sept. 18, 2012) (discussing 
recusal of Justices in the case challenging the Affordable Care Act) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review); George Zornick, The Nation: Clarence 
Thomas Vs. Legal Ethics, NPR (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.npr.org/ 
2011/11/15/142339329/the-nation-clarence-thomas-vs-legal-ethics (last visited 
Sept. 18, 2012) (discussing whether Justice Thomas should recuse himself in the 
case challenging the Affordable Care Act) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 11. See Louis J. Virelli III, The (Un)Constitutionality of Supreme Court 
Recusal Standards, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 1181. 
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and to offer solutions to the systemic constitutional problems 
surrounding recusal at the Court. It recognizes that although 
Congress may be constitutionally prohibited from directly 
regulating Supreme Court recusal, Congress retains 
constitutional authority and responsibility to indirectly influence 
recusal in ways that may better comport with our constitutional 
scheme. 
There are at least three major benefits to reexamining 
recusal in the light of constitutional structure. First, such a 
review exposes the most serious problem with the current 
Supreme Court recusal regime, the (largely overlooked) 
constitutional impasse between Congress and the Court over 
recusal.12 Congress’s prior attempts to directly regulate recusal 
have been met with indifference or polite disregard by the 
Court,13 which in turn triggered calls for even more rigorous 
congressional regulation.14 There are significant problems with 
                                                                                                     
 12.  The constitutional “impasse” advanced here is similar to the first 
element of a “constitutional showdown” as defined by Professors Posner and 
Vermeule: “[A] disagreement between branches of government over their 
constitutional powers.” Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional 
Showdowns, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 991, 997 (2008). The conflict over recusal does 
not yet rise to the level of a “showdown,” however, because it neither “ends in 
the total or partial acquiescence by one branch in the views of the other [nor] . . . 
creates a constitutional precedent.” Id. 
 13. See 79 U.S.L.W. 2389 (Apr. 19, 2011) (describing Justice Kennedy’s 
testimony before the House Subcommittee on Financial Services and General 
Government, in which the Justice expressed the view that “there is a 
constitutional problem” with Congress prescribing ethical rules for the Court); 
2011 YEAR-END REPORT, supra note 3, at 7 (noting that “the limits of Congress’s 
power to require recusal [of Supreme Court Justices] have never been tested”). 
The Court’s position was confirmed in its recent refusal of a congressional 
request to voluntarily adopt its own recusal reforms. See 2011 YEAR-END 
REPORT, supra note 3, at 8–9 (explaining that the Justices’ recusal decisions are 
unreviewable by the other Justices or another judicial body, and that those 
decisions are materially different from those of lower-court judges and thus 
harder to comport with the existing law on recusal); Letter from Chief Justice 
Roberts to Five Members of the Senate Judiciary Committee (Feb. 17, 2012) 
[hereinafter Chief Justice Letter], available at http://big.assets.huffing 
tonpost.com/LtrtoChairmanLeahyonYear-EndReport02172012.pdf (explaining 
that, despite the Senators’ request, “for the reasons explained in my year-end 
report, the Court does not plan to adopt the Code of Conduct for United States 
Judges”). For a more detailed discussion of Supreme Court recusal practice, see 
infra Part II.A.2. 
 14. See, e.g., Supreme Court Transparency Disclosure Act of 2011, H.R. 
 
1542 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1535 (2012) 
this approach. Direct regulation of recusal is legally and 
practically unenforceable against the Justices. Furthermore, the 
Court has never conceded that Congress has the constitutional 
authority to directly regulate its recusal practices, and has 
consistently acted as if that authority is lacking.15 The result is 
an effective impasse between Congress and the Court over 
recusal that has implications for the legitimacy, integrity, and 
efficacy of both Branches. 
Second, reexamining recusal in the light of constitutional 
structure better reveals the nature and dynamics of the inter-
branch conflict over recusal as well as the potential solutions to 
that conflict. These solutions depend on a fundamental, yet 
previously unanswered, question relating to Supreme Court 
recusal—how should the impasse be resolved, and who is 
responsible for resolving it? The answers lie with the separation 
of powers and, ultimately, with Congress. Viewing recusal as a 
separation of powers problem reveals that Congress and the 
Court are not equally capable of facilitating a successful 
resolution of the current impasse over recusal. The judicial 
options delegated to the Court by the Constitution are likely to 
harm the public perception, and thus democratic legitimacy, of 
both Branches by making the Court seem self-serving or 
obstinate. The constitutional choices assigned to Congress, by 
contrast, offer greater possibilities for coordinated efforts between 
the two Branches in pursuing their respective agendas regarding 
recusal. In terms of how a resolution should be achieved, focusing 
on Congress’s role as a constitutional actor allows us to see the 
entire range of constitutional options available to it, including 
                                                                                                     
862, 112th Cong. § 3 (2011) (requiring recusal reform); Robert Barnes, Roberts: 
Justices Won’t Adopt Code of Conduct, WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 2012, at A7. 
(explaining that “[m]embers of Congress, a group of law professors and outside 
groups have called upon the court to adopt” ethics reform); Law Professor 
Letter, supra note 2, at 1 (advocating for recusal reform); Senator Letter, supra 
note 4 (requesting the Supreme Court to formally adopt the Code of Conduct for 
United States Judges). 
 15. These factors are also relevant to the constitutional question of whether 
Congress has the authority to directly regulate Supreme Court recusal in the 
first instance, a question that is addressed infra at Part II.A and in my previous 
work. See Virelli, supra note 11, at 1185 (stating that separation of powers 
principles prevent Congress from directly regulating Supreme Court recusal). 
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various indirect approachessuch as impeachment, procedural 
reforms, judicial confirmation, appropriations, and investigations—
that permit Congress to influence the Justices’ recusal decisions 
without upsetting the delicate balance and coordination between the 
Branches that our constitutional scheme requires. 
Third, reevaluating recusal in terms of constitutional 
structure provides insights into much larger questions about how 
best to handle inter-branch disputes. The separation of powers 
anticipates conflict among the coordinate Branches of the federal 
government, but it does not always provide easy answers as to 
how those conflicts should be treated or resolved. When two 
Branches reach an impasse over which has the power to act, is 
the answer a matter of law or constitutional politics? Which 
branch must or should take the initiative in promoting an 
amicable and workable resolution? Is the answer more difficult 
when the disagreement involves the Court? The answers to these 
questions are pivotal to understanding more fully the intricacies 
of our constitutional structure, as well as to maintaining a 
legitimate and effective constitutional democracy. The instant 
analysis of the impasse between Congress and the Court over 
recusal offers a useful view into the various approaches to be 
taken and political and institutional benefits to be sought with 
regard to other inter-branch conflicts. 
This Article draws on the literature regarding Congress’s role 
as a constitutional interpreter to argue that the separation of 
powers is critical to resolving the current impasse between 
Congress and the Court over recusal because it offers unique 
answers as to both why Congress must take the lead in resolving 
the impasse and how that resolution should be achieved. It 
contends that Congress should use indirect constitutional 
approaches, rather than direct regulation, to influence the 
Justices’ recusal practices because doing so will alleviate the 
intractable tension created by direct congressional regulation of 
the Court and promote the democratic legitimacy of both 
Branches by reflecting a better balance of power between them. 
Part II describes the current Supreme Court recusal debate, 
including the constitutional impasse that has arisen between 
Congress and the Court over recusal. Part III draws on the 
literature regarding Congress’s role as a constitutional 
interpreter to more closely examine its role regarding recusal. It 
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identifies the constitutional limits on Congress’s power over 
recusal and explains why Congress, rather than the Court, must 
be primarily responsible for breaking the constitutional impasse 
over recusal, albeit through indirect measures. Part IV addresses 
the array of indirect constitutional tools available to Congress 
regarding recusal and makes the normative case for why 
Congress should take the initiative to resolve the current impasse 
over recusal at the Court. Part V concludes and discusses some of 
the broader implications of the recusal analysis for the separation 
of powers. 
II. The Debate over Recusal at the Court 
The debate over recusal at the Supreme Court can be 
described in terms of two distinct viewpoints. The first is a 
reformist view. The overwhelming majority of commentary from 
legal academics, members of Congress, and journalists supports 
some measure of recusal reform for the Court. Proponents of 
reform express concern about the impact of the Justices’ recusal 
practices on the legitimacy of the Court and on the due process 
rights of individual litigants. The opposing view is focused on 
judicial independence. It is primarily represented—and 
occasionally, if rarely, put forth—by the Justices themselves. It is 
grounded in concerns about constitutional structure and function, 
and as such, centers on the unique role of the Court within our 
constitutional system. The interaction of these differing 
perspectives has created not only a heated controversy, but also 
an impasse in the conversation about Supreme Court recusal 
that, in my view, must be addressed if either set of concerns is to 
be alleviated. 
A. Supreme Court Recusal in Action 
Before fleshing out these contrasting views on Supreme 
Court recusal, it is useful to explain how recusal at the Court 
works. Supreme Court recusal has consistently operated on 
parallel tracks of congressional regulation and Supreme Court 
adjudication. 
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1. Congressional Regulation of Supreme Court Recusal 
Since the beginning of the Republic, Congress has engaged in 
direct regulation of federal judges’ recusal practices. The 
Judiciary Act of 1792 contained the first statutory recusal 
standards.16 From 1792 through 1948, Congress revised the 
recusal standards for federal judges several times, and “‘in each 
instance . . . enlarged the enumerated grounds for seeking 
disqualification.’”17 None of these revisions, however, applied to 
Supreme Court Justices. In 1948, Congress amended the existing 
recusal statute to include “justices” in addition to “judges” and 
required recusal where a judge or Justice had been a material 
witness or of counsel, possessed a “substantial” interest in the 
case, or was related to an attorney or party in the case such that 
it would be “improper, in [the judge’s] opinion” for the judge to 
hear that case.18 In 1972, the American Bar Association (ABA) 
adopted a new recusal rule in its Model Code of Judicial Conduct 
that, inter alia, required recusal of a judge “in a proceeding in 
which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”19 
Two years later, Congress amended the federal recusal statute to 
codify the ABA Model Code’s objective reasonableness standard.20 
This is the version of the federal recusal statute that applies to 
Supreme Court Justices today. 
                                                                                                     
 16. Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 11, 1 Stat. 275, 278–79.  It was not until 
1821 that Congress offered recusal standards that added anything significant to 
the common law criteria for judicial recusal, and even then the question of 
enforcement was left entirely to the judge being asked to recuse himself and was 
not applied to the Justices of the Supreme Court. See Act of Mar. 3, 1821, ch. 51, 
3 Stat. 643. 
 17. Debra Lyn Bassett, Recusal and the Supreme Court, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 
657, 664 (2004–05) (quoting RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: 
RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES § 23.1, at 672 (1996)). 
 18. Id. (emphasis added). 
 19. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E (2004). The Code also 
mandated recusal when a judge was personally biased, had served as a lawyer 
in the controversy, had a financial interest in the outcome of the case, or was 
within the third degree of relationship with a party, lawyer, interested person, 
or material witness in the case. See id. at 3E(1)(a)–(e). 
 20. See Act of Dec. 5, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-512, 88 Stat. 1609 (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2006)) (requiring that a justice, judge, or 
magistrate disqualify himself or herself, inter alia, “in any proceeding in which 
his impartiality might be questioned”). 
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In March 2011, however, thirty-three members of the House 
of Representatives sought to further expand the requirements for 
Supreme Court recusal with the introduction of the Supreme 
Court Transparency and Disclosure Act.21 The bill was inspired in 
part by a letter from 138 law professors to the House and Senate 
Judiciary Committees outlining the need for legislation to 
“protect the integrity of the Supreme Court.”22 The letter argued 
that the Code of Conduct for United States Judges should be 
applied to Supreme Court Justices.23 It then stated that “justices 
must be subject to an enforceable, transparent process governing 
recusal”24 and suggested some procedural reforms to achieve that 
goal, such as requiring a “written opinion when a Supreme Court 
justice denies a motion to recuse” and instituting “a procedure . . . 
for review of a decision by a Supreme Court justice not to 
recuse.”25 The bill, in turn, mandated that “[t]he Code of Conduct 
for United States Judges . . . shall apply to the justices of the 
United States Supreme Court.”26 It required the Justices to 
disclose “in the public record of the proceeding the reasons for the 
denial of [a recusal] motion” and established “a process under 
which . . . other justices or judges of a court of the United States” 
shall review a Supreme Court Justice’s denial of a recusal 
motion.27 Although the bill has not yet been adopted, it evidences 
                                                                                                     
 21. See Supreme Court Transparency Disclosure Act of 2011, H.R. 862, 
112th Cong. (2011). 
 22. Law Professor Letter, supra note 2, at 1. 
 23. Id. at 2. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 3. 
 26. H.R. 862, § 2(a). 
 27. Id. § 3(a)(2), (b). In addition to attempting to regulate Supreme Court 
recusal directly, Congress has begun in recent months to utilize some of its 
other constitutional tools with regard to the Justices’ recusal practices, 
including asking sitting Justices to testify about recusal matters. On April 14, 
2011, Justices Breyer and Kennedy testified before a House subcommittee about 
Supreme Court ethics and recusal standards, and on October 5, 2011 Justices 
Breyer and Scalia testified about the same topic before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee. See supra note 5. Although both instances added public attention 
and awareness to the question of Supreme Court ethics and recusal as well as 
engaged the Court and its individual members actively and personally in the 
debate in a way that statutory prescriptions do not, they were relatively low-
profile events that were not entirely dedicated to ethics and recusal questions. 
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the ongoing interest in legislative solutions to Supreme Court 
recusal issues. 
Congress’s focus on direct regulatory solutions to the 
perceived problems with Supreme Court recusal represents a 
popular and well-intentioned attempt to promote the important 
features of legitimacy and integrity at the Court. This regulatory 
approach has nevertheless failed to effectively constrain the 
Justices. 
2. The Justices’ Recusal Practices 
A brief examination of the history of the Court’s recusal 
practices reveals that Supreme Court recusal operates in almost 
precisely the same way today as it did at the Founding—as a 
personal, independent, unreviewable decision by an individual 
Justice whether to participate in an individual case. Around the 
time of the Founding, recusal was both procedurally and 
substantively a purely judicial question. Recusal doctrine was the 
product of judge-made common law,28 and judges were 
empowered to make the initial (and, in the case of United States 
Supreme Court Justices, the final) ruling as to their own 
recusal.29 
Decisions by prominent members of the Court also reflect the 
Justices’ unfettered approach to recusal. Chief Justice John 
                                                                                                     
As such, they did not have the full impact that more formal, targeted hearings 
may provide. For a more detailed discussion of the promise of congressional 
hearings for seeking resolutions to the impasse over recusal at the Court, see 
infra Part IV.A.4. 
 28. See FLAMM, supra note 1, §§ 1.2−1.4, at 5–8 (describing recusal 
practices as developing in the English common law and being adopted by the 
American colonial courts and, later, the federal Judiciary). 
 29. All of this information is consistent with historical accounts of the 
importance placed on the independence of judges in the period. As Professor 
Gerber explains in his detailed account of judicial independence in the colonial 
courts, a separate and independent judiciary was vitally important to each of 
the colonial and state systems that functioned as precursors to our federal 
government under the Constitution, as well as to the Framers as a check 
against potential overreaching by the Legislature, especially in the area of 
federal state relations. See SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, A DISTINCT JUDICIAL POWER: 
THE ORIGINS OF AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY, 1606–1787, 34−37 (2011). 
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Marshall presided over and wrote his famous opinion in Marbury 
v. Madison30 despite the fact that he was personally responsible 
for failing to deliver the judicial commission that gave rise to the 
case. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes reviewed several cases as a 
Supreme Court Justice that he had participated in as a member 
of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.31 Similarly, 
Justice Hugo Black sat for multiple cases reviewing legislation he 
had been instrumental in passing as a member of the Senate.32 
Finally, Chief Justice Harlan Stone retracted his own recusal 
decision in a case, not because his views changed regarding his 
fitness to participate, but because he was concerned that without 
his participation the Court would not be able to achieve a 
quorum.33 
This sort of independent decision-making by the Justices did 
not change after Congress amended the recusal statute in 1948 to 
purportedly include Supreme Court Justices.34 The Justices 
continued to determine their own recusal status without any 
review or, in most cases, any public explanation for their decision. 
The rare instances where the Justices chose to publicly disclose 
                                                                                                     
 30. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 31. See generally Worcester v. Worcester Consol. St. Ry. Co., 196 U.S. 539 
(1905), aff’g 64 N.E. 581 (Mass. 1902); Dunbar v. Dunbar, 190 U.S. 340 (1903), 
aff’g 62 N.E. 248 (Mass. 1901); Glidden v. Harrington, 189 U.S. 255 (1903), aff’g 
61 N.E. 54 (Mass. 1901); Williams v. Parker, 188 U.S. 491 (1903), aff’g 55 N.E. 
77 (Mass. 1899). 
 32. See generally Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, United Mine 
Workers of Am., 325 U.S. 161 (1945) (construing the Fair Labor Standards Act); 
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding the constitutionality of 
the FLSA). Justice Black authored the FLSA while in the Senate. See Jeffrey W. 
Stempel, Rehnquist, Recusal, and Reform, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 589, 611 (1987). 
His decision to participate in a case argued before the Court by a former law 
partner even drew the public ire of Justice Robert Jackson in the only 
documented dispute among Supreme Court Justices about recusal. See generally 
Jewell Ridge, 325 U.S. at 897 (Jackson, J., concurring); see also Dennis J. 
Hutchison, The Black-Jackson Feud, 1988 SUP. CT. REV. 203, 203 (1988) (noting 
that Justice Jackson’s public disagreement “shocked the country”). 
 33. See N. Am. Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686 (1946); Stempel, supra note 32, at 
618–19 (describing Chief Justice Stone’s standards for disqualification as 
“flexible”). 
 34. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 455, 62 Stat. 908 (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2006)) (including any “justice or judge of the 
United States” in recusal requirements). 
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their views regarding recusal confirm that the Justices’ decisions 
were made individually and independently. In Laird v. Tatum,35 
then-Associate Justice Rehnquist published a memorandum 
explaining his decision not to recuse himself from a case 
challenging the constitutionality of a domestic surveillance 
program that he had been involved with (and testified about 
before Congress) during his time in the Justice Department’s 
Office of Legal Counsel.36 Although Justice Rehnquist cited the 
relevant recusal statute, he went on to remind the reader that 
“under the existing practice of the Court disqualification has been 
a matter of individual decision,”37 and pointed out that the unique 
nature of the Court makes Supreme Court recusal difficult as an 
institutional matter.38 In light of these special considerations, 
Justice Rehnquist argued that a Supreme Court Justice has a 
“duty to sit where not disqualified,”39 and as such should not 
“bend[] over backwards” to recuse himself.40 Justice Scalia 
described a similar process more than twenty years later in his 
memorandum in Cheney v. U.S. District Court.41 Justice Scalia 
was asked to recuse himself as a result of his recent participation 
in a hunting trip with the Vice President, who was a named party 
in the suit. In explaining his reasons for not recusing himself, 
                                                                                                     
 35. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972).  
 36. See Stempel, supra note 32, at 592 (discussing Justice Rehnquist’s 
participation in Laird v. Tatum). See generally Laird, 408 U.S. at 2 
(demonstrating that Justice Rehnquist participated in determining the 
constitutionality of a domestic surveillance program).  
 37. Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 833 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., mem.).  
 38. See id. at 837 (denying a motion for the Court to withdraw its opinion 
in Laird, 408 U.S. 1). Justice Rehnquist made the identical argument in another 
memorandum explaining a decision not to recuse himself in Microsoft Corp. v. 
United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1303 (2000): 
Finally, it is important to note the negative impact that the 
unnecessary disqualification of even one Justice may have upon our 
Court. Here—unlike the situation in a District Court or a Court of 
Appeals—there is no way to replace a recused Justice. Not only is the 
Court deprived of the participation of one of its nine Members, but 
the even number of those remaining creates a risk of affirmance of a 
lower court decision by an equally divided court. 
 39. Laird, 409 U.S. at 837. 
 40. Id. at 838 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 41. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913 (2004) (Scalia, J., mem.). 
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Justice Scalia rejected the statutory presumption that he should 
“resolve any doubts in favor of recusal” because “the Supreme 
Court . . . is different.”42 
The Court reinforced the idea that the Justices have their 
own permissive view of recusal in its 1993 Statement of Recusal 
Policy.43 The Statement was signed by seven of the nine sitting 
Justices and only addressed cases where a Justice’s relative 
participates in a matter before the Court.44 As Professor 
Sherrilyn Ifill described it, “the Recusal Policy simply reflects the 
Justices’ own sense of what to them would constitute a 
reasonable basis upon which to question a judge’s impartiality.”45 
Most recently, Chief Justice Roberts explained in his Year-End 
Report that “[l]ike lower court judges, the individual Justices 
decide for themselves whether recusal is warranted.”46 He went 
on to explain that due to institutional differences between the 
Supreme Court and the lower courts, a “Justice accordingly 
cannot withdraw from a case as a matter of convenience or simply 
to avoid controversy. Rather, each Justice has an obligation to the 
Court to be sure of the need to recuse before deciding to withdraw 
from a case.”47 All of these examples demonstrate that, at 
minimum, the Justices consider a host of prudential factors in 
making their recusal decisions, and they do so unencumbered by 
the prospect of review or the presence of statutory requirements. 
As Professor Jeffrey Stempel so aptly described it, “Supreme 
Court recusal practice provides an almost unique illustration in 
American government of substantive law without force when 
applied to a certain institution.”48 
                                                                                                     
 42. Id. at 915. 
 43. See Press Release, U.S. Supreme Court, Statement of Recusal Policy 
(Nov. 1, 1993), reprinted in FLAMM, supra note 1, app. D, at 1101–03 
[hereinafter Statement of Recusal Policy]. 
 44. Justices Blackmun and Souter did not sign the policy. See id. at 1101–
03 & n.1. 
 45. Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Do Appearances Matter?: Judicial Impartiality and 
the Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore, 61 MD. L. REV. 606, 626 (2002) [hereinafter 
Ifill, Do Appearances Matter?] (emphasis omitted). 
 46. 2011 YEAR-END REPORT, supra note 3, at 8. 
 47. Id. at 9. 
 48. Stempel, supra note 32, at 642. 
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B. The Arguments over Reform 
The Justices’ longstanding practice of making individualized, 
unreviewable recusal decisions has not, however, gone unnoticed. 
Critics of the Court’s recusal practices argue that the Justices’ 
failure to submit their decisions to more traditional legal 
processes has damaged the integrity and reputation of the Court. 
The Justices’ increasingly publicized involvement in political 
causes and organizations has highlighted concerns about the 
fairness and impartiality of the Justices’ decisions and has 
resulted in calls for more stringent ethics and recusal 
standards.49 The fact that the Justices’ recusal decisions are 
unreviewable has incited discussion about the quality of those 
decisions, especially in fact-specific inquiries like recusal in which 
a Justice functions as both fact finder and adjudicator.50 
Advocates of recusal reform have suggested mandating review of 
an individual Justice’s decision not to recuse by the remainder of 
the Court or by a special committee of federal judges assembled 
specifically for that purpose. Professor Stempel has proposed a 
standard of review under which “[a]ny party aggrieved by the 
refusal of a Supreme Court Justice to disqualify himself may, on 
timely motion, obtain review by the full Supreme Court.”51 The 
                                                                                                     
 49. The most recent and popular movement in this regard is to apply the 
Code of Conduct for United States Judges to the Justices. See Supreme Court 
Transparency Disclosure Act of 2011, H.R. 862, 112th Cong. § 2(a) (2011); Law 
Professor Letter, supra note 2, at 2. 
 50. As Professor Stempel explained: 
The Court also lacks any formal rule, mechanism, or custom of 
permitting fact development in aid of a recusal motion . . . [T]o this 
author’s knowledge, litigants questioning the impartiality of a 
Supreme Court Justice have never been permitted to develop the 
facts of the alleged conflict under the auspices of the Court. 
Occasionally, as in Tatum, a Justice will offer a version of the facts in 
answer to the motion, which hardly passes as meaningful discovery or 
even scrutiny. 
Stempel, supra note 32, at 642; see also Amanda Frost, Keeping Up 
Appearances: A Process-Oriented Approach to Judicial Recusal, 53 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 531, 576 (2005) (noting how in his memorandum in Cheney v. U.S. District 
Court, “Justice Scalia revealed facts about circumstances and logistics of the trip 
that previously had been unknown” as part of his explanation for deciding not to 
recuse himself from the case). 
 51. Stempel, supra note 32, at 644. 
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2011 House bill on Supreme Court ethics and recusal went 
further, allowing for review of a Justice’s decision not to recuse by 
“other justices or judges or a court of the United States, among 
whom retired justices and senior judges . . . may be included.”52  
The most compelling criticism of the Court’s recusal practices 
involves the Justices’ reluctance to explain their decisions. The 
Court offers public explanations of its decisions as a means of 
remaining accountable and protecting its own legitimacy. The 
Justices’ reluctance to explain their recusal decisions imperils 
that accountability and legitimacy, especially because the 
practice is out of step with judicial behavior more broadly. The 
lack of transparency in the Court’s current recusal practices has 
been described as indefensible in a modern democratic society, 
particularly in an age where other information about the Justices’ 
practices is so readily available, and has inspired calls for 
statutory requirements that Justices publish their reasons for 
denying a recusal motion.53 Professor Debra Lynn Bassett has 
advocated for greater disclosure of the Justices’ reasons for 
recusal through “statements of interest.”54 More recently, 
Professors William Yeomans and Herman Schwartz have argued 
that: 
[T]he courts’ fundamental legitimacy rests on the notion that 
judges . . . explain what they have done in reasoned opinions 
for all to read. . . . This same transparency is even more 
essential when Justices apply the law to themselves. . . . 
Courts obviously need secrecy for their deliberations and 
decision making. But there can be no harm in a justice 
explaining why he or she withdraws from a case or refuses to 
withdraw.55 
                                                                                                     
 52. H.R. 862, § 3(b) (emphasis added). The prospect of allowing lower court 
judges to review Supreme Court recusal decisions potentially runs afoul of the 
constitutional requirement that there be “one supreme Court.” U.S. CONST. art. 
III, § 1. 
 53. See H.R. 862, § 3(a)(2) (“If a justice of the Supreme Court denies a 
motion . . . that the justice should be disqualified . . . the justice shall 
disclose . . . the reasons for the denial of the motion.”); Law Professor Letter, 
supra note 2, at 2. 
 54. Bassett, supra note 17, at 695. 
 55. Yeomans & Schwartz, supra note 4. 
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Finally, the above complaints evoke a common concern about the 
effects of the Justices’ recusal practices on the public perception 
of, and confidence in, the Court. For an institution like the 
Supreme Court that depends so heavily for its institutional 
effectiveness on public confidence,56 any damage done to that 
perception presents a significant problem for the Court 
specifically, for the other institutions of government, and for the 
principle of separation of powers more generally. 
The responses to these arguments for recusal reform come 
principally from the Justices themselves. They focus, perhaps not 
surprisingly considering their source, less on the nature of the 
Justices’ recusal decisions and more on the effects of those 
decisions on the Court’s institutional mission. The central theme 
of this viewpoint is derived from the common law “rule of 
necessity,” under which a judge’s decision to recuse is overridden 
by the lack of an adequate replacement to hear the case.57 In the 
context of the lower federal courts, the rule of necessity is 
effectively a nullity. Congress has provided, pursuant to its power 
to create the lower federal courts, myriad options for calling into 
service replacement judges in the event a judge is recused.58 The 
                                                                                                     
 56. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833, 865–66 (1992)  
The Court’s power lies, rather, in its legitimacy, a product of 
substance and perception that shows itself in the people’s acceptance 
of the Judiciary as fit to determine what the Nation’s law means and 
to declare what it demands. . . . Thus, the Court’s legitimacy depends 
on making legally principled decisions under circumstances in which 
their principled character is sufficiently plausible to be accepted by 
the Nation. 
 57. See United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 213 (1980) (“‘[A]lthough a judge 
had better not, if it can be avoided, take part in the decision of a case in which 
he has any personal interest, yet he not only may but must do so if the case 
cannot be heard otherwise.’”(quoting F. POLLOCK, A FIRST BOOK OF 
JURISPRUDENCE 270 (6th ed. 1929))); see also FLAMM, supra note 1, § 20.2, at 
576–77 (explaining that the “rule of necessity” involves the principle that 
disqualification will not be permitted to destroy the only tribunal with power to 
act in the premises—that is, “where disqualification would result in an absence 
of judicial machinery capable of dealing with a matter, . . . disqualification must 
yield to necessity”). 
 58. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 291, 292, 294 (2006) (permitting active circuit court 
judges, active district court judges, and retired judges or Justices, respectively, 
to sit by designation).  
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Supreme Court, however, is different. The constitutional mandate 
that there be “one supreme Court”59 creates significant—if not 
impenetrable—barriers to the availability of replacement 
Justices.60 The lack of replacement Justices in turn creates the 
possibility that the recusal of a single Justice will facilitate a tie 
vote, resulting in a non-precedential affirmance of the decision 
below that does not “resolve the significant legal issue presented 
by the case.”61 Recusal is also problematic for the litigants, the 
argument goes, because a decision by an irreplaceable Justice to 
recuse himself is “effectively the same as casting a vote against 
the petitioner.”62 In cases involving at least one recusal, the 
petitioner must garner a larger percentage of the available 
Justices’ votes both on the merits (five out of eight rather than 
five out of nine) and at the certiorari stage (four out of eight 
rather than four out of nine for a certiorari petition).63 The 
recusal of multiple Justices is even more problematic for the 
Court, as it could defeat quorum in a specific case and thus make 
the Court powerless to exercise its constitutional function as the 
final adjudicator of the “cases or controversies” properly before 
it.64  
                                                                                                     
 59. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 60. See Letter from Chief Justice Hughes to Senator Wheeler, Mar. 22, 
1937, available at http://newdeal.feri.org/court/hughes.htm (“The Constitution 
does not appear to authorize two or more Supreme Courts or two or more parts 
of a Supreme Court functioning in effect as separate courts.”); see also Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg, An Open Discussion with Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 36 CONN. L. 
REV. 1033, 1039 (2004) (explaining that “there’s no substitute for a Supreme 
Court Justice”); Wheeler, supra note 10, at 2 (contending that a court of lower 
court judges sitting in review of Supreme Court recusal decisions “would most 
likely violate the Constitution’s ‘one Supreme court’ mandate”). But see Lisa T. 
McElroy & Michael C. Dorf, Coming Off the Bench: Legal and Policy 
Implications of Proposals to Allow Retired Justices to Sit by Designation on the 
Supreme Court, 61 DUKE L.J. 81, 104 (2011) (arguing that retired Justices, but 
not those that have resigned their commissions, may be eligible to substitute for 
recused Justices in Supreme Court cases). 
 61. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913, 915 (2004) (Scalia, J., mem.). 
See also Statement of Recusal Policy, supra note 43, at 1103. 
 62. Cheney, 541 U.S. at 916. 
 63. Professor Lubet described this phenomenon as the “Certiorari 
Conundrum.” Steven Lubet, Disqualification of Supreme Court Justices: The 
Certiorari Conundrum, 80 MINN. L. REV. 657, 661–65 (1996). 
 64. Virelli, supra note 11, at 1213–17. These same arguments may apply in 
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There are other reasons to support the Justices’ retaining 
control over recusal that are not grounded in concerns about a 
lack of eligible replacements for a recused Justice. Justice Scalia 
has argued that limiting the Justices’ independence over recusal 
decisions could lead to politically motivated attacks designed to 
influence the outcome of a case by forcing unsympathetic Justices 
to recuse themselves.65 He explains that “[t]he people must have 
confidence in the integrity of the Justices, and that cannot exist 
in a system that assumes them to be corruptible by the slightest 
friendship or favor, and in an atmosphere where the press will be 
eager to find foot-faults.”66 The Justices have also raised 
constitutional concerns about congressional influence over 
recusal decisions at the Court. While testifying before the House 
Subcommittee on Financial Services and General Government,67 
Justice Kennedy pointed out that “there is a constitutional 
problem” with making statutory recusal standards binding on the 
Court.68 In his Year-End Report, Chief Justice Roberts made a 
point of explaining that “the limits of Congress’s power to require 
recusal [of Supreme Court Justices] have never been tested. The 
Justices follow the same general principles with respect to 
recusal as other federal judges, but the application of those 
principles can differ due to the unique circumstances of the 
Supreme Court.”69 
                                                                                                     
other contexts, such as the prompt filling of vacancies on the Court, but do not 
raise the same constitutional problems focused on here, as vacancies are not 
(except in the nearly unprecedented case of impeachment) created by Congress 
and thus are not an example of an exercise of congressional power rendering the 
Court inoperable.  See infra Part III.B. 
 65. This phenomenon is considered by many to be the driving force behind 
the recent calls for Justices Kagan and Thomas to recuse themselves from cases 
reviewing the Affordable Care Act. See, e.g., Mukasey, supra note 10 (“The 
persistence of recusal issues appears to have little to do with the legal merits . . . 
but a great deal to do with . . . agenda-driven politics . . . .”). 
 66. Cheney, 541 U.S. at 928.  
 67. Malloy, supra note 5, at 2389. 
 68. Id.  
 69. 2011 YEAR-END REPORT, supra note 3, at 7. 
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C. The Impasse 
The ongoing debate over the proper role of legislative 
involvement in Supreme Court recusal practice reflects a 
constitutional impasse between Congress and the Court. 
Although proponents of statutory recusal standards acknowledge 
the important differences between recusal in the lower courts and 
the Supreme Court,70 concerns over the integrity, fairness, and 
transparency of the Court have caused them to look to Congress 
to standardize and strengthen the Court’s recusal standards. But 
Congress’s attempts to regulate the Court’s recusal practices 
have inspired both direct and indirect resistance from the 
Justices. In February of 2012, Chief Justice Roberts responded to 
a request from five members of the Senate Judiciary Committee 
asking the Court to formally adopt the Judicial Conference of the 
United States Code of Conduct for United States Judges, which 
sets ethical and recusal standards for the lower federal courts. 
The Chief Justice plainly stated in a letter to the Senators that 
“the Court does not plan to adopt the Code of Conduct.” The Chief 
Justice’s remarks came in the wake of his Year-End Report, in 
which he highlighted the unique role of the Supreme Court 
within the Judiciary and made clear that the Justices consider 
their ethical and recusal obligations to be individual and 
independent.71 
These recent (and defiant) comments about recusal are the 
most direct in a long list of indications that the Justices do not 
feel bound by congressional attempts to regulate their recusal 
decisions. For instance, the Court has never conceded that 
Congress has the constitutional authority to set recusal 
standards.72 Moreover, although recusal remains a relatively 
                                                                                                     
 70. See, e.g., FLAMM, supra note 1, § 29.4, at 916–17 (suggesting that there 
may be a “more compelling ‘duty to sit’ for Supreme Court Justices than for 
other judges”); Bassett, supra note 17, at 682–93 (discussing proposals for 
standards of Supreme Court recusal); Ifill, Do Appearances Matter?, supra note 
45, at 619 (“To be certain, Justices on the Supreme Court face legitimate 
concerns that are not at issue for judges on other courts who are faced with 
recusal motions.”). 
 71. 2011 YEAR-END REPORT, supra note 3, at 9. 
 72. See id. at 7 (“[T]he limits of Congress’s power to require recusal have 
never been tested.”). 
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common practice at the Court,73 the Justices rarely explain their 
decisions.74 When explanations are proffered, institutional 
concerns about the effective functioning of the Court predominate 
over the statutory standards put forth by Congress.75 Most 
importantly, because the statutory standards are not enforceable 
against the Court and because the Court’s decisions are not 
reviewable, there is no coercive legal action available to Congress 
to force the Justices to change their practices. In the words of 
Professor Ifill, “the Justices encourage and protect a fiercely 
independent approach to their recusal determinations.”76 
This impasse is more than a legal abnormality or 
inconvenience. In many ways, it is the source of much of the 
public frustration with, and criticism of, the Court and Congress 
over recusal. On a small scale, the impasse makes it more 
difficult to achieve any sort of lasting resolution or thoughtful 
treatment of the recusal question as the two sides effectively talk 
past one another. On a much grander scale, the impasse over 
recusal raises the same systemic problem as any seemingly 
irreconcilable dispute between two coequal Branches—doubts 
about the legitimacy of our constitutional democracy. As the two 
Branches continue to appear at odds over when and how 
Supreme Court Justices should refrain from participating in 
specific cases, both sides appear to be obstinate, arbitrary, 
ineffective, or some combination thereof. This promotes an air of 
lawlessness around the issue that weakens confidence in our 
public institutions and creates problems for our constitutional 
structure. Finally, the recusal impasse is significant because it 
could be the first step in what Professors Posner and Vermeule 
                                                                                                     
 73. See McElroy & Dorf, supra note 60, at 99 (explaining that “Justices 
would almost certainly recuse themselves in clear-cut conflict situations”); 
see also Times Topics, Elena Kagan, NYTIMES.COM (Oct. 4, 2010) 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/k/kagan_elena/index.html 
(last visited Sept. 18, 2012) (noting that “[b]ecause of her tenure as solicitor 
general, Justice Kagan has recused herself from about half of the 54 cases” 
so far on the Court’s docket for the 2010 term) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 74. See, e.g., Frost, supra note 50, at 569 (“Judges who recuse themselves 
rarely issue a decision explaining why.”). 
 75. See infra notes 111–17 and accompanying text. 
 76. Ifill, Do Appearances Matter?, supra note 45, at 622. 
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call “constitutional showdowns”—inter-branch disputes over 
constitutional authority that end in the development of new 
constitutional precedents.77  
The harmful effects of the impasse over recusal represent a 
serious and heretofore unforeseen or unmentioned problem 
within Supreme Court recusal. The existing debate over what the 
Court should be required to do and whether those requirements 
would lead to untenable consequences largely misses the point. 
The impasse between Congress and the Court over recusal should 
first be viewed as a constitutional separation of powers problem 
in order to properly contextualize the entire range of tensions and 
issues at stake. Only then can we envision a solution that is 
worthy of a conflict between two coequal Branches of government. 
III. Recusal and the Separation of Powers 
A. Congress’s Constitutional Responsibilities 
Resolving a conflict between two Branches of government 
necessarily evinces the separation of powers. The Framers’ 
concept of the separation of powers is often attributed to 
Montesquieu,78 and is embodied in a tripartite constitutional 
structure that envisions constitutional responsibilities for each 
branch that are separate and apart from its counterparts in order 
to protect against overreaching or aggrandizement by any single 
branch. This has remained a foundational principle of American 
                                                                                                     
 77.  See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 12, at 997. 
 78. See BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 149–62 (Thomas 
Nugent trans., Hafner Publishing Co. 1949) (1748) (discussing separation of 
powers as a concept for ensuring liberty). In addition to being an implicit part of 
many of the arguments about governmental structure at the Convention, 
Montesquieu’s views regarding the separation of powers were explicitly relied 
upon by several of the delegates. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 391 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (remarks of Butler) (“The 
great Montesquieu says, it is unwise to entrust persons with power, which by 
being abused operates to the advantage of those entrusted with it.”); 2 THE 
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 34 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) 
(remarks of Madison) (“[A]ccording to the observation of Montesquieu, 
tyrannical laws may be made that they may be executed in a tyrannical 
manner.”). 
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government ever since. As the Court recently reiterated in Stern 
v. Marshall,79 the separation of powers, at minimum, anticipates 
a division of labor among the Branches, such that some spheres of 
authority are reserved exclusively to individual Branches.80 The 
Stern Court went on to acknowledge, however, that “the three 
Branches [of the federal government] are not hermetically sealed 
from one another.”81 In fact, some redundancies are necessary in 
order to effectively protect against the aggrandizement and 
encroachment that the Framers saw as crucial to warding off 
tyranny.82 Chief among these redundancies is the shared 
responsibility of all three constitutional Branches of government 
to interpret the Constitution, especially with regard to the 
separation of powers.83 As James Madison explained: 
I beg to know upon which principle it can be contended that 
any one department draws from the Constitution greater 
powers than another in marking out the limits of the powers of 
the several departments. The Constitution is the charter of the 
people to the government; it specifies certain great powers as 
absolutely granted and marks out the departments to exercise 
them. If the constitutional boundary of either be brought into 
question, I do not see than any one of these independent 
departments has more right than another to declare their 
sentiments on that point . . . .84 
                                                                                                     
 79. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011). 
 80. As Chief Justice Roberts articulated in Stern: 
Under “the basic concept of separation of powers . . . that flow[s] from 
the scheme of a tripartite government” adopted in the Constitution, 
“the ‘judicial Power of the United States’ . . . can no more be shared” 
with another branch than “the Chief Executive, for example, can 
share with the Judiciary the veto power, or the Congress share with 
the Judiciary the power to override a Presidential veto.” 
Id. at 2608 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
 81. Id. at 2609. 
 82. See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation 
of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 617 (1984) (“This 
checks-and-balances inquiry—a comparison of impacts on ‘essential functions’—
is . . . at the heart of the framers’ [separation of powers] formula.”). 
 83. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and 
Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave 
Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 1966 (2003) (“Both the Court and Congress interpret 
the Constitution from the perspective of a particular institution.”). 
 84. 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 238–39 (William T. Hutchinson et al. 
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Madison’s view was echoed by Presidents Jefferson and Jackson85 
and nearly two centuries later by the Supreme Court in United 
States v. Nixon:86 “In the performance of assigned constitutional 
duties, each branch of the Government must initially interpret 
the Constitution, and the interpretation of its powers by any 
branch is due great respect from the others.”87 
The scholarly literature on Congress’s interpretive 
responsibilities is, not surprisingly, wide-ranging and diverse. 
Questions abound about, inter alia, Congress’s institutional 
competency to interpret the Constitution,88 the role of 
institutional design in improving that core competency,89 and how 
to balance the interpretive role of nonjudicial actors like Congress 
against that of the Judiciary.90 This robust debate, however, does 
                                                                                                     
eds., 1962–91). See also THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 277 (James Madison) 
(Colonial Press ed, 1901) (“The several departments being perfectly co-ordinate 
by the terms of their common commission, none of them, it is evident, can 
pretend to an exclusive or superior right of settling the boundaries between 
their respective powers.”). 
 85. Jefferson wrote that “nothing in the Constitution has given [the judges] 
a right to decide for the Executive, more than to the Executive to decide for 
them.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Mrs. John Adams (Sept. 11, 1804), in 11 
THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 49, 50 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1905); see 
also President Jackson’s Veto Message to the Senate (July 10, 1832), in 2 
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 576, 582 (James D. Richardson ed., 
1908) (“The opinion of the judges has no more authority over Congress than the 
opinion of Congress has over the judges, and on that point the President is 
independent of both.”). 
 86. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
 87. Id. at 703. 
 88. See, e.g., Symposium, The Most Disparaged Branch: The Role of 
Congress in the Twenty-First Century, Panel III: Is Congress Capable of 
Conscientious Responsible Constitutional Interpretation?, 89 B.U. L. REV. 499, 
449–538 (2009) (featuring commentary by Professors Hugh Baxter, Michael 
Gerhardt, Mark Tushnet, and Jeffrey Tulis); Louis Fisher, Constitutional 
Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63 N.C. L. REV. 707, 707 (1985) (arguing 
that Congress “is fulfilling the duty it shares with the judiciary and the chief 
executive to uphold the Constitution”); Abner Mikva, How Well Does Congress 
Support and Defend the Constitution?, 61 N.C. L. REV. 587, 590 (1983) 
(“Congress should make more of an effort to screen legislation for possible 
constitutional shortcomings and to clarify its motives as an aid to the courts.”). 
 89. See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Institutional Design of 
a Thayerian Congress, 50 DUKE L.J. 1277, 1278 (2001) (arguing that Congress 
can be improved by focusing “upon questions of institutional design”). 
 90. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial 
 
SUPREME COURT RECUSAL 1561 
not ultimately take issue with the narrower conception of 
legislative constitutional interpretation articulated by the 
Founding Fathers and the Court. As Professor James Bradley 
Thayer stated in his seminal article The Origin and Scope of the 
American Doctrine of Constitutional Law,91 “it is the legislature 
to whom this power is given—this power, not merely of enacting 
laws, but of putting an interpretation on the [C]onstitution which 
shall deeply affect the whole country.”92 In the more than 100 
years since Professor Thayer’s pronouncement, a general 
consensus has emerged that the separation of powers includes an 
obligation of Congress to consider the constitutionality of its 
actions vis-à-vis the other Branches.93 That is not to say that 
Congress is a better source of constitutional understanding than 
the courts, or that Congress as a descriptive matter engages in 
robust constitutional interpretation regularly. None of these far 
more controversial issues is necessary to the task at hand. 
Because Supreme Court recusal has created an impasse between 
Congress and the Courts, it is enough for the present discussion 
to acknowledge that Congress is constitutionally authorized and 
(at least in part) responsible for evaluating the constitutionality 
                                                                                                     
Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1362 (1997) (discussing 
extrajudicial constitutional interpretation and arguing for “judicial primacy 
without qualification”). 
 91. James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine 
of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893). 
 92. Id. at 136. 
 93. Professors Alexander and Schauer put it thusly: 
A recurrent claim in American constitutional discourse is that judges 
should not be the exclusive and authoritative interpreters of the 
Constitution. The Constitution speaks to all public officials, it is said, 
and thus all officials, not just judges, must make their own decisions 
about what the Constitution commands. To hold otherwise, it is 
argued, is to fail to recognize the constitutional responsibilities of 
officials who happen not to be judges. 
Alexander & Schauer, supra note 90, at 1359–60; see also Michael Stokes 
Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 
83 GEO. L.J. 217, 343–45 (1994) (maintaining that executive officials should not 
defer to constitutional decisions of the Judiciary that they believe are wrong); 
Mark V. Tushnet, The Hardest Question in Constitutional Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 
1, 25–28 (1996) (arguing that non-exclusivity is the route to a socially desirable 
“populist” constitutional law). 
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of its actions and, in turn, for resolving the constitutional tension 
created by Supreme Court recusal. 
Reorienting Supreme Court recusal in a constitutional 
framework and acknowledging Congress’s constitutional 
responsibilities with regard to the separation of powers highlights 
two significant constitutional questions about the impasse over 
recusal. The first is whether Congress has the constitutional 
authority to limit a Justice’s participation in a specific case. The 
second is which branch of government is best suited to resolve 
that impasse. In answering each of these questions, the 
remainder of this Part highlights the need—as a matter of both 
constitutional law and policy—for alternative approaches by 
Congress to the issue of recusal at the Court. 
B. Constitutional Limits on Congressional Regulation 
Congressional regulation of Supreme Court recusal triggers 
serious concern about the separation of powers;94 may Congress 
pass legislation affecting the Court’s recusal decisions, or does the 
Constitution vest sole authority for those decisions in the Justices 
themselves? Article III unequivocally vests the “judicial Power of 
the United States” in the Supreme Court and “in such inferior 
Courts as the Congress may . . . ordain and establish.”95 It does 
not, however, offer any further explanation of the scope or 
substance of the judicial power, much less whether and to what 
extent that power includes the authority of Supreme Court 
Justices to decide questions of their own recusal. Without greater 
textual guidance on the matter, constitutional history, practice, 
                                                                                                     
 94. See Virelli, supra note 11 (advancing this argument in greater detail). 
 95. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. This express congressional power over the 
lower federal courts is not applicable to the Supreme Court, and is a significant 
limit on the inherent power of those lower courts. It shifts the balance of power 
between Congress and the lower courts toward Congress while leaving the 
balance between Congress and the Supreme Court undisturbed. This difference 
in the constitutional power sharing arrangement between Congress and the 
Supreme Court versus the lower federal courts is the main reason why the 
instant analysis focuses solely on recusal at the Supreme Court, rather than 
federal courts in general. 
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and structure become crucial to understanding the constitutional 
status of Supreme Court recusal. 
The records of the Constitutional Convention and state 
ratifying debates are virtually silent on the meaning of the 
“judicial Power” generally, let alone the power of judges and 
Justices to decide questions about recusal.96 A historical analysis 
of Supreme Court recusal under Article III must therefore be 
based both on the sources of information most commonly 
understood to have been relied upon by the Framers in fashioning 
the judicial power—the “business of the Colonial courts and the 
courts of Westminster when the Constitution was framed”97—as 
well as on “early congressional and judicial precedent” 
interpreting Article III.98 Although little direct evidence exists of 
the Framers’ view of Supreme Court recusal specifically, the 
evidence that is available supports the idea that recusal was, in 
and around the Founding, both procedurally and substantively a 
question for an independent Judiciary. English and colonial 
judges developed highly permissive common law standards for 
recusal99 and used those standards to decide their own recusal 
                                                                                                     
 96. See James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, “Some Effectual Power”: The 
Quantity and Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 696, 708 (1998) (offering compelling evidence of the meaning of 
various terms in Article III pertaining to judicial power, but concluding that 
little if any information from the period provides useful insight into the meaning 
of “judicial Power” specifically); William F. Ryan, Rush to Judgment: A 
Constitutional Analysis of Time Limits on Judicial Decisions, 77 B.U. L. REV. 
761, 767 (1997) (“In fact, the records of the Convention contain absolutely no 
discussion of the phrase ‘judicial Power’ . . . .”); see also Felix Frankfurter & 
James Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in 
“Inferior” Federal Courts—A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARV. L. REV. 
1010, 1018 (1924) (“[T]he Constitution has prescribed very little in determining 
the content . . . of judicial power.”). 
 97. Evan Caminker, Allocating the Judicial Power in a “Unified Judiciary”, 
78 TEX. L. REV. 1513, 1518 (2000) (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. 
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 150 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)); see also 
Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 96, at 1017 (“‘Judicial power’ sums up the 
whole history of the administration of justice in English and American courts 
through the centuries.”). 
 98. Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the 
Structural Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735, 822 (2001). 
 99. See FLAMM, supra note 1, § 1.4, at 8 (“In the pre-Revolutionary 
American Colonies, as in England, the only accepted ground for disqualifying a 
judge was pecuniary interest in a pending cause; and for years following 
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matters.100 With regard to the Supreme Court in particular, the 
early Congresses chose not to intervene in the Justices’ exercise 
of their recusal power even after they chose to do so for the lower 
federal courts.101 This practice indicates that, at the time the 
Constitution was drafted, Supreme Court recusal was a matter 
for the Court through its exercise of the judicial power granted to 
it by Article III. 
Longstanding governmental practice further corroborates 
this view.102 Although the most well-known examples occur in 
disputes between the Legislative and Executive Branches,103 
                                                                                                     
independence American law, like that of the mother nation, admitted of very 
few grounds for seeking judicial disqualification.”). 
 100. See, e.g., John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605, 
612 (1947) (“In the Supreme Court disqualification has always been the 
prerogative of each individual Justice . . . .”). 
 101. See Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 11, 1 Stat. 275, 278–79 (regulating 
only federal “judges,” rather than “justices”). 
 102. As Justice Frankfurter and Professor Landis explained: “The scope and 
qualities of a power which has been voluminously exercised since 1789 must be 
looked for in the cumulative proof of its exercise.” Frankfurter & Landis, supra 
note 96, at 1018. The Court has continually relied on traditional understandings 
and practices of the three Branches of government to determine the proper 
constitutional balance among them. Perhaps the most well-known statement 
regarding the division of authority between the Legislative and Executive 
Branches is found in Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube 
Co. v. Sawyer, in which he articulated a three-tier system for resolving 
separation of powers disputes. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 
U.S. 579, 635–38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice Jackson’s famous 
system considered evidence of historical congressional “inertia, indifference or 
quiescence” to the challenged executive action as important to understanding 
the proper balance of power between the Branches. Id. at 637. Although 
congressional intent regarding the conduct of a coordinate branch is difficult to 
determine, its relevance in Justice Jackson’s framework highlights the 
important fact for present purposes: that constitutional meaning in separation 
of powers disputes can be gleaned from established governmental practices in 
the contested area. Justice Frankfurter made this clear in his own Youngstown 
concurrence:  
In short, a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to 
the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, engaged 
in by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution, 
making as it were such exercise of power part of the structure of our 
government, may be treated as a gloss on “executive Power” vested in 
the President by § 1 of Art. II.  
Id. at 610–11 (Frankfurter, J. concurring). 
 103.  See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); Pocket Veto 
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government practice has also played an important role in 
resolving conflicts between legislative and judicial power.104 In 
the case of Supreme Court recusal, longstanding legislative and 
judicial custom indicates that the decision to recuse a Supreme 
Court Justice is not only a judicial decision, but also one that is 
constitutionally protected from legislative interference. 
Congress did not seek to regulate Supreme Court Justices’ 
recusal practices for the first 150 years of the Republic. In 1948, 
Congress amended the federal recusal statute to include, for the 
first time, “[a]ny justice . . . of the United States,”105 but it did not 
set any procedural standards for deciding recusal questions, 
disrupt the ongoing practice of judges resolving their own recusal 
questions in the first instance, or address the review of those 
initial decisions. With regard to the Supreme Court, the amended 
statute has led to the seamless continuation of the Justices’ 
historical recusal practices—unreviewable, individualized 
determinations by each Justice of their own qualification to sit in 
a particular case, without any obligation to justify or otherwise 
explain their decisions. As Professor Ifill described it, “[i]t 
appears that the Justices on the Court enjoy the unreviewable 
power to determine individually whether and when to disqualify 
themselves.”106 Nevertheless, in light of ample historical and 
                                                                                                     
Case, 279 U.S. 655 (1929); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926); United 
States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915). 
 104. In Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991), the Court confirmed 
judges’ ability to impose sanctions for bad faith conduct in the absence of any 
statutes or regulations to that effect. See id. at 42, 58. The Chambers Court 
explained that “[i]t has long been understood that ‘[c]ertain implied powers 
must necessarily result to our Courts . . . from the nature of their institution.’” 
Id. at 43 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 
Cranch) 32, 34 (1812)). In Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962), the 
Court also relied on longstanding practice to uphold judicial power to sua sponte 
dismiss for failure to prosecute despite an existing rule ostensibly requiring a 
motion by defendant to trigger dismissal. See id. at 628–30. 
 105. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). 
 106. Ifill, Do Appearances Matter?, supra note 45, at 620. See also R. 
Matthew Pearson, Note, Duck, Duck Recuse: Foreign Common Law Guidance 
and Improving Recusal of Supreme Court Justices, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1799, 1813–14 (2005) (“The ‘historic practice’ of the United States Supreme 
Court has always been to refer motions for recusal to the Justice whose 
disqualification is sought. Thus . . . the actual procedure by which the decision is 
made is truly a creature of tradition.”). 
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modern evidence of the Court’s erratic and at times seemingly 
unprincipled recusal decisions, Congress has not taken any 
definitive steps to enforce its statutory requirements or to 
indicate that it considers the Court’s ongoing recusal practices 
problematic.107 This acquiescence or indifference to Supreme 
Court recusal practice is evidence of the Justices’ constitutional 
authority to decide recusal questions independently.108 
The Justices’ longstanding practices suggest a similar 
constitutional interpretation. Prior to the recusal statute being 
amended to include them, several of our most esteemed Justices 
made highly controversial recusal decisions without any 
interference or objection from Congress.109 A similar pattern 
emerged after the statute was amended, as the Justices 
continued to make controversial decisions that were at best 
tangentially faithful to the statutory standard.110 In their 
memoranda in Laird111 and Cheney,112 respectively, Justices 
Rehnquist and Scalia relied heavily on extrastatutory factors in 
justifying their decisions not to recuse.113 They cited the Justices’ 
individual power to make recusal decisions,114 the recusal 
                                                                                                     
 107. But see Supreme Court Transparency Disclosure Act of 2011, H.R. 862, 
112th Cong. (2011) (proposing substantive and procedural overhaul of Supreme 
Court recusal). 
 108. The instant example of the Justices retaining dominion over their own 
recusal decisions despite congressional action to the contrary provides even 
stronger support for the Supreme Court’s exclusive power over recusal than 
evidence of judicial power in the absence of legislative activity. See generally 
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981). 
 109. See supra notes 30–33 and accompanying text (describing controversial 
recusal decisions by Chief Justices Marshall and Stone and Justices Holmes and 
Black). 
 110. The Court has never taken a case in which it has applied the federal 
recusal statute to one of its own members. See Bassett, supra note 17, at 676–80 
(outlining the “four major opinions touching on section 455,” all of which dealt 
with recusal decisions by a lower court judge). 
 111. 409 U.S. 824 (1972). 
 112. 541 U.S. 913 (2004). 
 113. See Cheney v. United States Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913, 915−29 (2004) 
(giving Justice Scalia’s reasons for nonrecusal); Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 
824−39 (1972) (explaining Justice Rehnquist’s reasons for denying the motion to 
recuse). 
 114. See Laird, 409 U.S. at 833 (reminding the reader that “under the 
existing practice of the Court disqualification has been a matter of individual 
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precedents of other Justices,115 and the Court’s unique 
institutional features—such as its lack of substitute Justices and 
the problems created when it issues equally divided decisions116—
to support their conclusion that the Justices should employ an 
effective presumption against recusal.117 These memoranda 
                                                                                                     
decision”). 
 115 See Cheney, 541 U.S. at 924−26 (citing decisions by Justices White and 
Jackson not to recuse themselves despite their close friendships with high-
ranking members of the Administration); Laird, 409 U.S. at 829–30, 31 
(explaining that “different Justices who have come from the Department of 
Justice have treated the same or very similar situations differently” from one 
another, and Justice Rehnquist’s “impression is that none of the former Justices 
of this Court since 1911 have followed a practice of disqualifying themselves” in 
analogous cases). It is worth noting that one of the decisions that Justice Scalia 
cited as useful precedent occurred before the federal recusal statute was 
amended to include Supreme Court Justices. 
 116. See Cheney, 541 U.S. at 915 (identifying the potential problem of a “tie 
vote [leaving the Court] unable to resolve the significant legal issue presented 
by the case”); id. at 916 (explaining that recusal is “effectively the same as 
casting a vote against the petitioner”). Some proponents of congressional reform 
of Supreme Court recusal, including H.R. 862, the recent proposal introduced in 
the House, have suggested using circuit court judges to review Supreme Court 
recusal decisions. See Supreme Court Transparency Disclosure Act of 2011, H.R. 
862, 112th Cong. (2011). While such an arrangement may appeal to those 
concerned with the ethical ramifications of current Supreme Court recusal 
practices, there are significant constitutional problems with such an 
arrangement, including Article III’s mandates that there be only “one supreme 
Court,” and that Congress have power to create only “inferior courts.” U.S. 
CONST. art. III, § 1. Justice Rehnquist made the identical argument in another 
memorandum explaining a decision not to recuse himself in Microsoft v. United 
States: 
Finally, it is important to note the negative impact that the 
unnecessary disqualification of even one Justice may have upon our 
Court. Here—unlike the situation in a District Court or a Court of 
Appeals—there is no way to replace a recused Justice. Not only is the 
Court deprived of the participation of one of its nine Members, but 
the even number of those remaining creates a risk of affirmance of a 
lower court decision by an equally divided court. 
530 U.S. 1301, 1303 (2000). 
 117. More specifically, Justice Rehnquist argued that a Supreme Court 
Justice has an “even stronger” “duty to sit where not disqualified,” Laird, 409 
U.S. at 837, and as such Justices should not “bend [] over backwards” to recuse 
themselves. Id. at 838; see also Cheney, 541 U.S. at 915 (rejecting the federal 
recusal statute’s presumption in favor of recusal because the “Supreme 
Court . . . is different”). Justice Scalia added a warning that recusal would 
“harm the Court” by encouraging the use of recusal as a means of influencing 
the outcome of cases before the Court. Cheney, 541 U.S. at 927 (expressing 
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reveal the Justices’ general disregard for the statutory recusal 
standards. Although both Justices referred to the statutory text 
in their analyses, they did not employ any of the traditional tools 
of statutory interpretation; they did not parse the statutory 
language, attempt to divine congressional intent, examine 
legislative history, or evaluate lower court interpretations of the 
statute. Apparently, neither Justice thought of their analysis as 
primarily statutory, but instead as a broader, independent 
examination of their fitness to participate in the case at hand.118 
The Court’s 1993 “Statement of Recusal Policy”119 confirms 
the Justices’ commitment to independent, extrastatutory recusal 
decisions.  The Policy claimed to apply the relevant statute, but 
ultimately relied on institutional concerns to read it very 
narrowly.120 As Professor Bassett observed, the Court’s Recusal 
Policy “re-emphasized [the Justices’] negative view of recusal” by 
“simply reflect[ing] the Justices’ own sense of what to them would 
constitute a reasonable basis upon which to question a judge’s 
impartiality and appl[ying] that standard across the board.”121 
Justices Breyer and Kennedy reinforced the idea that the 
Supreme Court feels ultimately unrestrained in its recusal 
practice, and that this feeling may be constitutionally justified, 
during their congressional testimony in April of 2011,122 and 
                                                                                                     
concern that recusal in the instant case would effectively “give elements of the 
press a veto over participation of any Justices who had social contacts with . . . a 
named official,” and encourage “so-called investigative journalists to suggest 
improprieties and demand recusals”). 
 118. This is particularly noteworthy in the case of Justice Scalia, whose well 
documented views on statutory interpretation seek to avoid, seemingly at all 
costs, policy-based analyses of statutory issues. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: 
The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 863 (1989) (“[T]he main danger in 
judicial interpretation . . . of any law . . . is that the judges will mistake their 
own predilections for the law.”). 
 119. See Statement of Recusal Policy, supra note 43, App. D, at 1101–03. 
 120. See id. at 1103 (citing as support for its position the fear of strategic 
recusal motions, “the possibility of an even division on the merits of a case,” and 
a “distorting effect on the certiorari process” in cases where recusal occurs). 
 121. Bassett, supra note 17, at 681 (quoting Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Do Judicial 
Appearances Matter?: Judicial Impartiality and the Supreme Court in Bush v. 
Gore, 61 MD. L. REV. 606, 625, 626 (2002)). 
 122. See 79 U.S.L.W. 2389, 2389 (Apr. 19, 2011). During the hearing, Justice 
Kennedy testified that “there is a constitutional problem” with making ethics 
rules binding on the Court, and Justice Breyer reiterated “that it is a more 
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Chief Justice Roberts did the same in his Year-End Report.123 In 
sum, the Justices’ conduct and statements regarding recusal have 
consistently indicated that the Court, as a matter of 
constitutional practice, considers recusal an individual matter to 
be decided independently by each Justice, free from congressional 
interference. 
Constitutional structure offers a more complex analysis, but 
one that leads toward the same conclusion. There are no 
provisions in Article III that limit the Court’s exercise of its 
“judicial Power” over recusal. Neither of the two provisions that 
are commonly thought of as qualifying the judicial power, the 
provision empowering Congress to “ordain and establish” the 
inferior courts,124 and the clause enabling Congress to make 
“Exceptions” to the Court’s appellate jurisdiction,125 have any 
significant bearing on the Court’s power over recusal. The 
provision accounting for congressional creation of the inferior 
courts simply does not apply to the Supreme Court. The 
Exceptions Clause deals only with appellate jurisdiction, which is 
neither synonymous with recusal126 nor broad enough to include 
cases arising under the Court’s original jurisdiction. Finally, the 
Framers’ choice to empower Congress to affect Supreme Court 
                                                                                                     
complex decision for Supreme Court justices to decide whether to recuse 
themselves” than it is for lower court judges (who presumably are governed by 
§ 455) due to a lack of replacements for the Justices. Id. at 2389, 2390. 
 123. See 2011 YEAR-END REPORT, supra note 3, at 3−5 (discussing the 
“fundamental difference between the Supreme Court and the other federal 
courts”). 
 124. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 125. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. 
 126. Professor James Liebman and William Ryan have demonstrated that 
the Framers did not equate judicial power with jurisdiction. See Liebman & 
Ryan, supra note 96, at 708 (“We can confidently report . . . that . . . when 
Article III says ‘judicial Power,’ its drafters meant just that and not, e.g., 
‘jurisdiction’ . . . .”). This is consistent with our common understanding of 
judicial authority; there are many instances where judges exercise their judicial 
authority that do not bear on whether the court has the power to decide the case 
before it. See Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1243 (2010) 
(“‘Jurisdiction’ refers to ‘a court’s adjudicatory authority.’ Accordingly, the term 
‘jurisdictional’ properly applies only to ‘prescriptions delineating the classes of 
cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the persons (personal jurisdiction)’ 
implicating that authority.” (citations omitted) (quoting Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 
U.S. 443, 455 (2004))). Recusal is precisely one of those instances. 
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appellate jurisdiction suggests a countervailing intent to preclude 
congressional intrusion into those exercises of the Judicial 
power—like recusal—that are not expressly subjected to 
congressional authority under Article III.127  
The Impeachment Clauses in Article I128 are relevant to 
understanding the Justices’ constitutional authority over recusal 
because impeachment is the only textual authority for the 
removal of Article III judges, including Supreme Court 
Justices.129 This fact, however, triggers the interpretive canon of 
expressio unius est exclusio alterius (“to state the one is to exclude 
the other”); since recusal is not included along with impeachment 
as one of Congress’s constitutional powers over the Judiciary, it 
should not be treated as such.130 Separation of powers principles 
also preclude treating the Impeachment Clauses as relevant to 
the Court’s recusal powers. The severity and permanence of 
impeachment and the cumbersome procedures required to 
effectuate it are carefully designed to allow the Legislature to 
check judicial power without unduly threatening judicial 
independence.131 Permitting Congress to remove Justices from a 
                                                                                                     
 127. This argument evokes the interpretive canon of expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius (“to state the one is to exclude the other”). 
 128. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
 129. Congress does of course have the authority to create official positions 
within the federal government that function as at-will employment (individuals 
who serve at the pleasure of the President) or that expire after a term of years, 
in the case of many independent agencies. In these cases, however, the 
separation of powers calculus is different because the officials being removed by 
means other than impeachment are not constitutionally guaranteed to hold 
those offices “during good Behaviour.” Id. art. III, § 1. 
 130. See McElroy & Dorf, supra note 60, at 99 (“[I]mpeachment is the only 
available remedy for clearly unethical decisions not to recuse . . . .”). That is not 
to say that other issues about which the Constitution is silent, such as judicial 
review, are all equally problematic. Unlike judicial power, congressional power 
is carefully enumerated in eighteen clauses in Section 8 of Article I. It is 
therefore easier to assume that an omission of an aspect of legislative power 
from this list of eighteen sources is more significant than the exclusion of a 
specific aspect of judicial power from Article III, which limits its explanation of 
the authority of the federal courts to its grant of the “judicial Power” to the 
Supreme Court and any “inferior courts Congress may from time to time ordain 
and establish.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; id. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. 
 131. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (protecting judicial independence by 
providing federal judges with life tenure and salary protections). 
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particular case by a simple legislative mandate, rather than the 
full Article I impeachment process, threatens the independence of 
the Judiciary in a way not anticipated by constitutional text or 
structure.132 As a result, the Impeachment Clauses should be 
read in connection with Article III to support the proposition that 
recusal is constitutionally distinct from impeachment, and as 
such is an artifact of judicial, rather than legislative, 
constitutional authority.133 
The Necessary and Proper Clause134 grants Congress the 
power “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper 
for carrying into Execution . . . all other Powers vested by this 
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any 
Department or Officer thereof.”135 Unlike the provisions 
previously discussed, the Necessary and Proper Clause appears, 
at least facially, to grant Congress exceedingly wide latitude to 
regulate all aspects of government, including the courts. When 
read against the vesting clause of Article III,136 however, we see 
that Congress’s power under the Necessary and Proper Clause 
must end where the “inherent” judicial power bestowed upon the 
Court by Article III begins. If there is no realm of exclusively 
judicial power under the Constitution, then the Necessary and 
                                                                                                     
 132. That is not to say that Congress could not constitutionally employ its 
impeachment powers in an attempt to influence recusal decisions by Supreme 
Court Justices. See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 133. Congress may still be able to influence recusal standards in the lower 
courts. The point of introducing the Impeachment Clauses is simply to point out 
that by defining the impeachment power and assigning it to Congress, the 
Constitution’s structure offers insight into the proper constitutional home for 
judicial recusal. Impeachment is the only method explicitly provided for in the 
Constitution by which Congress may prevent an individual judge or Justice 
from performing his or her judicial duties under Article III. We can thus infer 
that the Constitution does not contemplate any additional congressional 
authority in the area, especially if those additional methods would expand 
congressional power to remove judges from cases at the expense of their 
obligations under Article III. 
 134. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. art. III, § 1 (assigning the “judicial Power of the United States” to 
the Supreme Court). Of course Article III also bestows the “judicial Power” on 
any “inferior courts that Congress may . . . establish,” but because the lower 
federal courts are not the subject of this analysis, the present discussion will 
focus solely on the inherent power of the Supreme Court. Id. 
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Proper Clause renders Congress supreme among the three 
Branches of government. Because the absolute supremacy of any 
one branch is anathema to our constitutional system,137 there 
must be some area of judicial power that belongs exclusively to 
the Justices.138 The specific issue pertaining to Supreme Court 
recusal is thus whether the Necessary and Proper Clause 
empowers Congress to regulate the Court’s recusal practices, or 
whether recusal is within the Court’s “inherent power” under 
Article III such that Congress (along with other governmental 
entities outside the Court) is precluded from doing so.139  
                                                                                                     
 137. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 264 (James Madison) (Colonial 
Press ed., 1901) (“The accumulation of all powers legislative, executive and 
judiciary in the same hands, whether of one, a few or many, and whether 
hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very 
definition of tyranny.”). 
 138. The Court has confirmed this idea on several occasions throughout its 
history. See, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 47 (1991) (“‘[W]e do 
not lightly assume that Congress has intended to depart from established 
principles’ such as the scope of a court’s inherent power.” (quoting Weinberger v. 
Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313 (1982))); Michaelson v. United States ex rel. 
Chi., St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Ry. Co., 266 U.S. 42, 65–66 (1924) 
(explaining that the inherent contempt power of the courts cannot be “abrogated 
nor rendered practically inoperative” by Congress); United States v. Klein, 80 
U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146–47 (1871) (explaining the importance of maintaining 
the separation of powers); United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 
(1812) (“Certain implied powers must necessarily result to our courts of justice 
from the nature of their institution.”). 
 139. The President and lower federal courts have no constitutional basis for 
asserting authority over Supreme Court recusal. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 
(describing all federal courts other than the Supreme Court as “inferior” and 
therefore without power to command the Supreme Court); see also discussion 
infra note 155 (discussing the President’s lack of constitutional authority over 
recusal at the Court). The Judicial Conference of the United States Code of 
Conduct for United States Judges also does not apply to Supreme Court 
Justices. See CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES, INTRODUCTION, 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rulesandpolicies/codesofconduct/codecon 
ductunitedstatesjudges.aspx (“This Code applies to United States circuit judges, 
district judges, Court of International Trade judges, Court of Federal Claims 
judges, bankruptcy judges, and magistrate judges.”). A broader consideration of 
whether recusal in the federal court system as a whole (including the lower 
federal courts) was part of the inherent judicial power vested by Article III 
would also need to consider the Tribunals Clause of Article I, by which Congress 
is expressly empowered “[t]o constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme 
Court.” U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 9. The Tribunals Clause, especially when read 
in conjunction with Article III’s vesting of the judicial power in “one supreme 
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain 
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The precise boundaries of the Court’s inherent power remain 
an open question, but a narrow consensus has emerged among 
commentators and the courts around the central features of that 
power. In addition to concurring that some inherent judicial 
power exists, there is widespread agreement that this power 
must at least include the ability to independently and completely 
decide individual cases that fall within the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts.140 As a court of last resort, and one that is singled 
out in the text of Article III as unique among the federal courts as 
a whole,141 the Supreme Court provides the strongest 
constitutional case for retaining the inherent power to decide 
cases properly before it. Even when viewed in light of this 
                                                                                                     
and establish,” is evidence that lower federal courts’ grant of the judicial power 
is subject to greater congressional control than that of the Supreme Court. Id. 
art. III, § 1, cl. 1; see id. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 (the Tribunals Clause). The issue is, 
however, beyond the scope of this analysis, which is only concerned with recusal 
at the Supreme Court. 
 140.  As Professor James Liebman and William Ryan explained: 
[T]he judicial Power means the Article III judge’s authority and 
obligation, in all matters over which jurisdiction is conferred, 
independently, finally, and effectually to decide the whole case . . . . 
By independently, finally, and effectually decide, we mean 
dispositively to arrange the rights and responsibilities of the parties 
on the basis of independently developed legal reasons, subject to 
review only by a superior Article III court. By case, we mean a court 
action that can be resolved on the basis of enforceable law, and by 
whole case, we mean not only the construction of applicable 
provisions of law but also their actual application to the facts to reach 
a decision. 
Liebman & Ryan, supra note 96, at 771 (emphasis removed) (internal quotation 
marks omitted); see also, e.g., Caminker, supra note 97, at 1519 (“[T]he core of 
the judicial power . . . is the authority to adjudicate and resolve Article III cases 
and controversies.”); David E. Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits of Congress’ Power 
Regarding the Judicial Branch, 1999 BYU L. REV. 75, 84–86 (stating that the 
vesting clause of Article III is “self-executing” with regard to issues of “judicial 
potency,” which includes the power to “adjudicate claims”); Frankfurter & 
Landis, supra note 96, at 1020 (explaining that Congress’s authority does not 
extend to regulation of fundamental features of courts such as the authority to 
independently and finally decide cases); Pushaw, supra note 98, at 741 (“[T]he 
constitutional provisions concerning congressional regulation of the judiciary do 
not pertain to the courts' exercise of their essential function of adjudication.”).  
 141. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (vesting “[t]he judicial Power . . . in one 
Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to 
time ordain and establish”). 
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(limited) understanding of inherent judicial power, Supreme 
Court recusal, at least the substantive standards for determining 
whether recusal is warranted,142 falls within the core of inherent 
judicial power under Article III. Because recusal precludes an 
individual Justice from participating in a case, the power to 
mandate recusal is the power to prevent any number of 
Justices—up to and including the entire Court—from exercising 
the core judicial function of deciding individual cases. A 
mandatory recusal statute could thus result in there not being 
enough Justices to decide a case that is otherwise properly before 
the Court. This would represent an unconstitutional intrusion 
into a core judicial power that is possible in every instance in 
which Congress seeks to provide substantive recusal standards 
for the Court.143 The Necessary and Proper Clause is thus not a 
valid source of congressional regulation of Supreme Court recusal 
because it has the significant potential to interfere with the 
power to decide cases that is inherent and exclusively vested in 
the Court by Article III.144 
                                                                                                     
 142. There is one aspect of recusal regulation that does not fall as neatly 
within the Court’s inherent power to decide cases—procedural rules. There is a 
stronger argument to be made that congressional promulgation of procedural 
requirements for the Supreme Court’s recusal decisions do not interfere with the 
exceedingly narrow definition of inherent power advanced here. This fact does 
not, however, change the significance of the present inquiry or its relevance to 
the question of how a separation of powers analysis can help identify the most 
effective and constitutionally sound resolution to the current impasse over 
recusal at the Court. See Virelli, supra note 11, at 1223–25 (addressing the 
merits of procedural reform as a means of resolving the inter-branch impasse 
over recusal). 
 143. The most common arguments in favor of congressional power over 
recusal—that Congress could build in exceptions or “fixes” to the recusal 
statute, that Congress can regulate recusal because it has control over the size 
and qualifications of the Court, or that Congress can regulate recusal because it 
has power over the Court’s appellate jurisdiction all fall short when confronted 
with this inherent power argument. See Virelli, supra note 11, at 1221–22 
(identifying the weaknesses in all three of the above arguments defending 
congressional involvement in Supreme Court recusal). 
 144. Because at first blush this argument may seem to beg questions about 
the constitutionality of more significant practices like judicial review, it is worth 
taking a moment to explain why the instant account of inherent judicial power 
does not apply equally to judicial interference with any inherent legislative 
authority of Congress. The answer lies in the fact that judicial review is limited 
to occasions in which Congress’s exercise of its legislative authority has run 
 
SUPREME COURT RECUSAL 1575 
It is not necessary that this constitutional analysis be beyond 
dispute for the subsequent discussion of Congress’s constitutional 
role in its current impasse with the Court over recusal. For 
present purposes, it is sufficient to acknowledge that there are 
legitimate constitutional questions about Congress’s authority to 
regulate recusal at the Court, and that constitutional uncertainty 
contributes significantly to the broader interbranch tensions over 
recusal. Those tensions include the normative question of how the 
interbranch conflict over recusal should be resolved within the 
context of our tripartite government. 
C. Why is this Congress’s Problem? 
Even if congressional regulation of Supreme Court recusal 
raises constitutional questions that contribute to the ongoing 
impasse between Congress and the Court over recusal, the 
question remains: Why is this Congress’s problem? Why not focus 
on the Court’s role in alleviating the impasse? The answer, like 
the question, lies in the separation of powers. The separation of 
powers depends, at least in part, on the political integrity of the 
individual Branches and the quality of the relationships among 
them. Any resolution to the interbranch conflict over recusal 
should therefore  seek to promote a sense of responsibility and 
comity on behalf of both Congress and the Court.145 When viewed 
                                                                                                     
afoul of a constitutional provision or mandate. Congress’s power over the 
Judiciary under the Necessary and Proper Clause is not similarly limited, nor 
would it be the sole prerogative of the Legislature to establish when the 
Judiciary has run afoul of the Constitution even in cases in which Congress 
sought to prevent a constitutional violation; it is, after all, “emphatically the 
province and duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is.” Marbury 
v. Madison, 1 U.S. (Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 145. Professor Paulsen uses the term “coordinacy” to describe the same 
concept: 
The “coordinacy” of the three branches of the federal government is 
one of the fundamental political axioms of our federal 
Constitution. . . . This does not mean that the branches are equal in 
the quantum of powers assigned to them. . . . Coordinacy is a term of 
power-relationship, not of power-scope. . . . It is the idea of coordinacy, 
even more than the cognate concept of separation on which it depends 
and builds, that fuels the system of “checks and balances” that guards 
against “a tyrannical concentration of all the powers of government in 
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in this light, it becomes clear that although the Court possesses 
the constitutional authority to resolve the recusal conflict, the 
mechanisms at its disposal are far more potentially damaging to 
the Court as an institution and to our constitutional system in 
general than those available to Congress. 
The Court has at least three measures at its disposal to 
resolve its impasse with the Legislative Branch over recusal, 
none of which are ultimately satisfactory when considered in 
light of the separation of powers. One is to state openly and 
explicitly that it will not comply with any statutory mandates 
regarding recusal because of constitutional concerns, issues of 
judicial integrity, or some other institutional reason. This 
approach would bring transparency and accountability to the 
Court’s position and would alleviate concerns that the Court is 
eluding statutory standards for some less compelling reason like 
political gain or mere convenience. This approach has, however, 
some considerable weaknesses in the context of the separation of 
powers. For one, without grounding its statement in legally 
binding authority, the Court could be made to look more 
obstinate than it would in the absence of a public statement. 
More importantly, a public statement of noncompliance may 
exacerbate, rather than help resolve, the conflict. Chief Justice 
Roberts’s Year-End Report, which is the closest example to date 
of a public explanation of the Court’s views on the recusal 
impasse, provoked a largely negative reaction. It prompted a 
letter from five Senators asking the Court to voluntarily adopt 
formal recusal standards.146 Professors Yeomans and Schwartz 
argued that “Chief Justice John Roberts’s response in his year-
end report to the increasing controversy over the ethics of 
Supreme Court Justices served to drive home the need for the 
high court to adopt reforms immediately,”147 and Professor Ifill 
characterized his statement as “far short of an adequate 
                                                                                                     
the same hands.” 
Paulsen, supra note 93, at 228–29; see also, e.g., Jonathan L. Entin, Separation 
of Powers, the Political Branches, and the Limits of Judicial Review, 51 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 175, 226 (1990) (“[T]he separation of powers assumes a minimum level of 
interbranch comity.”). 
 146. See Senator Letter, supra note 4. 
 147. Yeomans & Schwartz, supra note 4. 
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response,” primarily because it did not increase the “transparency 
of [recusal] procedures that go to the very legitimacy of the 
Court’s decisionmaking.”148 These critiques highlight the 
shortcomings of any mere statement by the Court that it will not 
comply with statutory recusal standards. In the current debate 
over recusal, an explanation of the status quo—even one based on 
high-minded principles like the separation of powers or 
institutional competence—will simply not suffice.149 
Alternatively, the Court could use its power as the final 
expositor on the Constitution to rule that the impasse between 
Congress and the Court over recusal is not legally justiciable. 
This relatively common approach in separation of powers cases 
often leads to positive results. The War Powers Resolution,150 for 
instance, has long been a source of interbranch controversy. A 
debate has persisted for decades regarding whether the 
Resolution is a constitutional limit on the President’s authority to 
use military force as Commander in Chief under Article II.151 
Although several members of Congress have expressed concern 
about various presidential decisions in relation to the War 
Powers Resolution,152 there have never been any attempts to 
judicially enforce it against the President,153 and several 
                                                                                                     
 148. Ifill, The Chief Strikes Out, supra note 4.  
 149. See id. (“I found Justice Roberts’ defense of the status quo in the 
Supreme Court’s recusal practice to be the most unsatisfying aspect of his 
remarks.”). 
 150. War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–48 (1973). 
 151. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
 152. Members of Congress raised concerns under the War Powers Resolution 
during President Clinton’s bombing of Kosovo in 1999 and President Obama’s 
bombing of Libya in 2011, and in both instances there was much public and 
scholarly debate over the constitutional basis for those objections. See, e.g., 
Geoffrey S. Corn, Clinton, Kosovo, and the Final Destruction of the War Powers 
Resolution, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1149, 1153 (2001) (discussing the debate 
over the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution); Jack Goldsmith, War 
Power: The President’s Campaign Against Libya is Constitutional, SLATE.COM 
(Mar. 21, 2011, 6:48 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2288869/ (last visited Sept. 
18, 2012) (same) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). In neither 
case, however, was there any serious threat of legal action by Congress to 
enforce the requirements of the Resolution. 
 153. See CHARLES A. SHANOR, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: STRUCTURE 
AND RECONSTRUCTION 208 (4th ed. 2009) (“The requirements of the War Powers 
Resolution were never tested in court. . . . No judicial decision has ever 
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Presidents have employed military force without strictly adhering 
to its requirements or challenging the statute in court.154 But the 
fact that the conflict between Congress and the Executive over 
the War Powers Resolution has never been substantively 
addressed by the Court does not mean that the Resolution is 
constitutionally problematic. Whether it refuses to do so for 
undisclosed policy reasons or because it formally concludes that 
the dispute is nonjusticiable as a matter of constitutional law, the 
presence of the Court as a neutral arbiter makes the lack of a 
legal resolution between the other two Branches more 
constitutionally palatable. A decision by the Court not to 
intervene legitimizes the otherwise seemingly unruly process of 
political interchange and compromise between Congress and the 
President by making it part of the constitutional design, thus 
creating political space for the Legislative and Executive 
Branches to better deal with complex questions about the use of 
military force on a case-by-case basis. 
The conflict over Supreme Court recusal, however, would not 
similarly benefit from a decision by the Court that it is without 
constitutional power to resolve the dispute. Unlike with the War 
Powers Resolution, there is no third-party mediator for the 
                                                                                                     
construed the War Powers Resolution.”); see also, e.g., Campbell v. Clinton, 203 
F.3d 19, 20−23 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (dismissing a case seeking to enforce the War 
Powers Resolution against President Clinton on justiciability grounds), cert. 
denied, 531 U.S. 815 (2000). 
 154. As Professor Jeffrey Tulis explained: 
In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, Congress passed a 
constitutionally aggressive statute, the War Powers Resolution, 
which seemed to display just the sort of institutional turf protection 
that the Federalist theory describes. Nevertheless, since the passage 
of the Resolution, the President has violated its terms repeatedly 
without challenge from Congress.  
Jeffrey K. Tulis, On Congress and Constitutional Responsibility, 89 B.U. L. REV. 
515, 516–17 (2009); see also JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: 
CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 49 (1993) (“[T]hanks 
to a combination of presidential defiance, congressional irresolution, and judicial 
abstention, the War Powers Resolution has not worked.”); LOUIS FISHER, 
PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 192 (1995) (“Presidents have generally done what 
they wanted to do, notwithstanding the War Powers Resolution.”); HAROLD 
HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION 39–40, 123 (1990) 
(discussing the continued use of force by the Executive Branch in defiance of the 
War Powers Resolution). 
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interbranch conflict over recusal at the Court.155 As a result, the 
same type of political exchange and compromise—such as the 
Justices citing to the statute in their recusal memoranda despite 
neither feeling bound by it nor applying it with the same force or 
rigor as they would other statutes156—loses the imprimatur of 
legitimacy that comes from direct or indirect endorsement of the 
process by a coequal branch of government. Instead, the Justices’ 
failure to comply makes them appear unprincipled, regardless of 
the true quality of their decisions. Thus, due to the seemingly 
inevitable unenforceability of congressional mandates regarding 
Supreme Court recusal and the absence of a constitutionally 
recognized third-party arbiter, a constitutional decision by the 
Court that the dispute is nonjusticiable is not a satisfactory 
resolution under the separation of powers. 
The third way the Court could break the impasse over the 
Justices’ recusal practices is to use its power of judicial review to 
invalidate the statutory recusal standards on the basis that they 
are unconstitutional interferences with the judicial power vested 
in the Court by Article III.157 This would amount to essentially 
deleting the word “justices” from the existing statute and 
returning it to its pre-1948 status, when it purported to cover all 
federal judges, but not Supreme Court Justices.158 This is perhaps 
                                                                                                     
 155. There is no constitutional basis for the President to intervene in a 
dispute between Congress and the Court over recusal, and review by any court 
other than the Supreme Court would run afoul of Article III’s hierarchy of “one 
Supreme Court” and other “inferior” courts. See Russell Wheeler, Regulating 
Supreme Court Justices’ Ethics—“Cures Worse than the Disease?”, BROOKING 
INST. (Mar. 3, 2011), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0321_justices_ 
ethics_wheeler.aspx?p=1 (last visited Sept. 18, 2012) (discussing the 
constitutional concerns surrounding proposals calling for the creation of a court 
to review recusal decisions) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); 
see also McElroy & Dorf, supra note 60, at 107–12 (considering the meaning of 
Article III’s “one supreme Court” requirement in the context of reviewing 
Supreme Court recusal decisions). 
 156. See supra notes 111–19 and accompanying text (outlining the Court’s 
prior practices of analyzing the federal recusal statute differently from other 
statutes). 
 157. For a more detailed treatment of this constitutional issue, see supra 
Part III.B, and see generally Virelli, supra note 11 (stating that separation of 
powers principles prevent Congress from directly regulating Supreme Court 
recusal). 
 158. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2006) (governing disqualification of Justices, 
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the most intuitive response to the problem, as we generally 
think—at least since Chief Justice Marshall’s famous 
pronouncement in Marbury—that matters of constitutional 
interpretation lie finally, and most comfortably, with the 
Judiciary.159 Despite its intuitive appeal, this approach is 
seriously flawed when viewed from a separation of powers 
perspective.  
As a general matter, Supreme Court review and invalidation 
of federal statutes is an unremarkable and fundamental feature 
of our constitutional existence.160 The stakes become a bit higher, 
however, when the statutes under review regulate not 
subordinate government actors or the public at large, but the 
highest levels of a coordinate branch. In those instances, 
questions of interbranch comity and cooperation become of 
paramount importance to ensure the continued functioning and 
legitimacy of the constitutional design. In the context of 
congressional regulation of Supreme Court recusal, concerns 
about comity and legitimacy counsel strongly against the Court 
striking the recusal statute. 
Some examples illustrate the effect of comity concerns on the 
Court. In Myers v. United States,161 the Court considered a 
question dividing the other two Branches of government—
whether Congress could limit the President’s authority to remove 
an executive official from office. The conflict had all the makings 
of an impasse: a postmaster who had been removed from office 
brought suit against the United States alleging that President 
Wilson’s decision to fire him ran afoul of a federal statute 
requiring the President to obtain “the advice and consent of the 
Senate” before removal.162 The President did not claim that the 
                                                                                                     
judges, and magistrate judges), with Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 11, 1 Stat. 275, 
278–79 (regulating only federal “judges,” rather than “justices”). 
 159. Chief Justice Marshall did, after all, famously explain in Marbury that 
it is “emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what 
the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 1 U.S. (Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 160. But see ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE 
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16–29 (1962) (discussing the “counter-
majoritarian difficulty” with judicial review). 
 161. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
 162. Act of July 12, 1876, § 6, as amended by 39 U.S.C. § 31 (1876). 
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Senate had consented to the postmaster’s removal under the 
terms of the statute, but simply that Congress was without 
constitutional authority to interfere with the Executive’s 
prerogative to manage its workforce. The Supreme Court took up 
the issue and held that the separation of powers precluded 
Congress from interfering with the President’s decision to remove 
executive officers at will.163 The statute was invalidated, and 
although not uncontroversial,164 the decision brought relative 
clarity to both Branches. Less than a decade later, the Court 
again addressed the removal issue, and held that Congress could 
limit the Executive’s removal authority in the context of 
independent agencies.165 Again, the Court’s conclusion was 
adopted as the authoritative solution to the interbranch conflict. 
Since then, the Court has addressed additional removal issues 
without any challenges to its institutional authority or capacity to 
do so.166 These examples show that the Court can be well-suited 
to resolve disputes between Congress and the Executive, and in 
fact may be an important bulwark against undue conflict between 
those Branches in its role as a neutral constitutional arbiter. 
The circumstances change dramatically, however, when the 
Court becomes involved in constitutional review of statutes that 
are targeted at the Court itself or the Justices. The most direct 
example of this phenomenon is in cases that have come before the 
Court under the Exceptions Clause of Article III.167 The 
                                                                                                     
 163. See Myers, 272 U.S. at 51 (discussing the President’s power to remove 
executive officers). 
 164. See FISHER, supra note 154, at 60–64 (discussing Chief Justice Taft’s 
decision in Myers and the subsequent reactions thereto). 
 165. See Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935): 
The authority of Congress, in creating quasi legislative or quasi 
judicial agencies, to require them to act in discharge of their duties 
independently of executive control cannot well be doubted; and that 
authority includes, as an appropriate incident, power to fix the period 
during which they shall continue in office, and to forbid their removal 
except for cause in the meantime. 
 166. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 
3138, 3164 (2010) (holding that the particular arrangement of “good cause” 
requirements for removal of members of the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board violated separation of powers principles, as the President did 
not have the authority to oversee the officials within the Executive Branch). 
 167. The Exceptions Clause is the best example here because it is the only 
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Exceptions Clause expressly empowers Congress to provide 
“Exceptions” or “Regulations” regarding the Supreme Court’s 
appellate jurisdiction.168 The Clause is the only constitutional 
provision that is aimed expressly and exclusively at the 
relationship between Congress and the Supreme Court; it does 
not empower any other government actor to influence the Court’s 
appellate jurisdiction, and does not permit Congress to do 
anything with respect to any other constituency of the Judicial 
Branch. The Exceptions Clause is thus the purest analog for the 
impasse between Congress and the Court over recusal, and as 
such provides useful insights into how the Court views its role as 
constitutional interpreter differently when the Court’s own 
institutional interests are at stake.  
The Court’s Exceptions Clause jurisprudence is the subject of 
longstanding debate, but one feature of that jurisprudence—and 
the most important feature for present purposes—is clear: The 
Court has never invalidated a statute solely on the basis that it 
overstepped Congress’s authority under the Exceptions Clause. 
The Court has upheld congressional authority in all but one case 
interpreting the Clause, albeit often narrowly and without 
conceding that the Court’s jurisdiction is entirely precluded.169 In 
                                                                                                     
constitutional provision that gives Congress authority over just the Supreme 
Court and not the other parts of the Judicial Branch. There are of course 
other—in fact significantly more common—instances in which the Court 
engages in judicial review of statutes that raise conflicts between the Legislative 
and Judicial Branches. See, e.g., CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 835−36 (1986) 
(resolving whether the statutory authorization of the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission to adjudicate certain claims unconstitutionally interfered 
with the authority of Article III judges). In terms of drawing analogies to the 
impasse over Supreme Court recusal, it is important to focus on the relationship 
not between Congress and the federal courts in general, but Congress and the 
Supreme Court. While there may be reasons of comity and legitimacy that 
prevent the Court from resolving disputes between the Legislature and the 
Judiciary as a whole, those problems are magnified significantly when the 
Court’s decision deals solely with its own authority vis-à-vis Congress. Because 
the instant analysis focuses solely on recusal practices at the Supreme Court, it 
is more instructive to draw analogies from equally narrow conflicts. The only 
constitutional conflict that is as narrow as—and is thus properly analogized to—
Supreme Court recusal is the conflict between Congress and the Court under 
the Exceptions Clause. 
 168. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. 
 169. See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 652 (1996) (upholding a federal 
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the lone case in which the Court did strike a statute under the 
Exceptions Clause, United States v. Klein,170 the Court went to 
great lengths to offer alternative explanations for its holding. 
Klein struck down a statute that required the Court to dismiss for 
lack of jurisdiction any suit to recover proceeds from property 
seized during the Civil War in which the claimant’s entitlement 
to the property was based on a presidential pardon. The Court 
importantly acknowledged Congress’s power to limit the Court’s 
appellate jurisdiction.171 It then declared the statute 
unconstitutional on the grounds that it impermissibly attempted 
to direct the outcome of specific cases in violation of the judicial 
power vested in the Court by Article III,172 and interfered with 
the President’s pardoning power under Article II.173 Taken 
                                                                                                     
statute against an Exceptions Clause challenge); Ex parte Yeager, 75 U.S. 85, 
106 (1869) (same); Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514−15 (1869) (same). 
 170. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1871). 
 171. See id. at 145 (“If it simply denied the right of appeal in a particular 
class of cases, there could be no doubt that it must be regarded as an exercise of 
the power of Congress to make ‘such exceptions from the appellate jurisdiction’ 
as should seem to it expedient.”). 
 172. The Klein Court explained that: 
[T]he language of the proviso shows plainly that it does not intend to 
withhold appellate jurisdiction except as a means to an end. Its great 
and controlling purpose is to deny to pardons granted by the 
President the effect which this court had adjudged them to have. . . . 
It is evident from this statement that the denial of jurisdiction to this 
court . . . is founded solely on the application of a rule of decision, in 
causes pending, prescribed by Congress. . . . It seems to us that this is 
not an exercise of the acknowledged power of Congress to make 
exceptions and prescribe regulations to the appellate power. The 
court is required to ascertain the existence of certain facts and 
thereupon to declare that its jurisdiction on appeal has ceased, by 
dismissing the bill. What is this but to prescribe a rule for the 
decision of a cause in a particular way? . . . We must think that 
Congress has inadvertently passed the limit which separates the 
legislative from the judicial power. 
Id. at 145–47. 
 173. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“[The President] shall have Power to 
grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States.”). The 
Klein Court went on to explain that: 
The rule prescribed is also liable to just exception as impairing the 
effect of a pardon, and thus infringing the constitutional power of the 
Executive. . . . To the executive alone is intrusted the power of 
pardon; and it is granted without limit. . . . Now it is clear that the 
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together, the Court’s Exceptions Clause jurisprudence 
demonstrates the Court’s reluctance to assert its own interests 
over those of Congress. It has generally affirmed Congress’s 
authority to limit the Court’s appellate jurisdiction,174 and even 
when it found it necessary to invalidate a statute it relied heavily 
on the countervailing interests of the Executive in doing so.175  
The purpose of the Exceptions Clause example is not to take 
a position as to the quality of the Court’s reasoning or conclusions 
in those cases. It is offered rather as support for the narrow 
proposition that the Court exercises its power of judicial review 
more cautiously when addressing conflicts between itself and 
another branch of government, as in the Supreme Court recusal 
context. While the Exceptions Clause analogy is a strong one, it is 
limited both by its relatively small number of cases and the fact 
that there are no corroborating examples, primarily because no 
other constitutional provisions single out the Court as the sole 
subject of regulation. Nevertheless, a normative analysis of the 
Court’s approach to resolving conflicts between itself and the 
other Branches confirms the impression left by the Court’s 
Exceptions Clause cases, and counsels strongly against the Court 
using its power of review to overturn the recusal statute. 
As an initial matter, cooperation and comity among the 
coordinate Branches of government are necessary to the effective 
functioning of our tripartite constitutional arrangement.176 The 
Branches are coequal and necessarily interactive,177 and 
                                                                                                     
legislature cannot change the effect of such a pardon any more than 
the executive can change a law. Yet this is attempted by the provision 
under consideration. . . . This certainly impairs the executive 
authority and directs the court to be instrumental to that end. 
Klein, 80 U.S. at 147–48. 
 174. See Felker, 518 U.S. at 654 (stating that the Act at issue did not violate 
the Exceptions Clause); Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. at 513 (stating that the 
Constitution gives Congress the power to “‘mak[e] exceptions to the appellate 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court’” (citation omitted)). 
 175. See Klein, 80 U.S. at 147–48 (discussing the potential infringement on 
the power granted by the Constitution to the Executive). 
 176. See Paulsen, supra note 93, at 228–29 (describing the need for 
coordinacy among the three Branches of the federal government); Entin, supra 
note 145, at 226 (explaining that “[t]he separation of powers assumes a 
minimum level of interbranch comity”). 
 177. See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 702 (1997) (“[O]ur . . . system 
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collaborate on nearly every issue of national importance such as 
the national budget, military readiness and deployment, social 
policy questions, and law enforcement initiatives. Although each 
branch is equipped with powerful constitutional checks designed 
to maintain a sense of equilibrium and balance within the federal 
structure, the use of those checks in a confrontational or 
unwelcome way may exchange short-term gains for long-term 
damage to governmental efficiency and productivity. For this 
reason alone, the Court should be cautious in exercising its 
powers of judicial review, especially in the context of resolving 
disputes in favor of one branch of government over another. As 
Professor Bruce Peabody and John Nugent explained:  
[W]e do not suggest that the judiciary should never intervene 
in separation of powers conflicts. But we do think this 
intervention should be infrequent [and] restrained . . . . The 
judiciary should, to the best of its ability, resist efforts to 
become embroiled in interbranch disputes while they are still 
unfolding. . . . [W]hen the judiciary does intervene in 
disagreements over the authority or powers of the different 
divisions of government, it should . . . address how its ruling 
will affect the various levels at which the separation of powers 
operate.178 
The remaining normative arguments against the Court 
striking the recusal statute are perfectly in line with the concerns 
expressed by proponents of recusal reform—protection of the 
Court’s public reputation and, in turn, its legitimacy as the final 
expositor of constitutional law. As Justice O’Connor explained, 
“The Court’s power lies, rather, in its legitimacy, a product of 
                                                                                                     
imposes upon the Branches a degree of overlapping responsibility, a duty of 
interdependence as well as independence the absence of which ‘would preclude 
the establishment of a Nation capable of governing itself effectively.’” (citation 
omitted)); id. at 703 (“As Madison explained, separation of powers does not 
mean that the Branches ‘ought to have no partial agency in, or no control over 
the acts of each other.’” (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 266 (James 
Madison) (Colonial Press ed., 1901))); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 
343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“While the Constitution 
diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will 
integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its 
branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.”). 
 178. Bruce G. Peabody & John D. Nugent, Toward a Unifying Theory of the 
Separation of Powers, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 40 (2003). 
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substance and perception that shows itself in the people’s 
acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to determine what the Nation’s 
law means and to declare what it demands.”179 She went on to 
explain that “[t]he underlying substance of this legitimacy . . . is 
expressed in the Court’s opinions, and our contemporary 
understanding is such that a decision without principled 
justification would be no judicial act at all.”180 Striking the 
portion of the recusal statute that governs the Justices invites 
criticism that the Court is aggrandizing power at the expense of 
at least one of the political Branches. This criticism, especially 
when combined with parallel critiques that the Court is becoming 
overly politicized,181 could undermine public confidence in the 
institution and its fitness not only to adjudicate, but also to fulfill 
its role under the separation of powers as a check on the other 
Branches. The Court’s legitimacy could be similarly imperiled by 
a decision striking regulations on Supreme Court recusal if such 
a decision appeared unprincipled. Particularly in an area such as 
Supreme Court recusal and the separation of powers, in which 
the constitutional text, history, and judicial precedent are at best 
sparse, a decision in which the Court favors its own authority 
over that of another branch—even in the face of a written opinion 
explaining the decision—could be seen as pretextual and thus 
democratically illegitimate. Finally, the Court’s Exceptions 
Clause jurisprudence provides yet another reason why the Court 
should refrain from using its power of review in the debate over 
recusal. Whereas application of the recusal statute could harm 
litigants by precluding them from receiving an otherwise 
constitutionally-provided level of judicial review in a single 
case,182 the application of a jurisdiction-stripping statute is 
almost certainly more likely to bar review in a wider array of 
                                                                                                     
 179. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 
(1992). 
 180. Id. 
 181. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (noting recent critiques of the 
Justices’ political associations and interactions). 
 182. See supra Part III.B (outlining the constitutional difficulties with 
congressional influence over Supreme Court recusal based at least in part on the 
fact that a recusal statute threatens to preclude the Court from exercising its 
inherent authority to decide individual cases). 
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cases. Nevertheless, despite their potential for harm, the Court 
has been extremely reluctant to strike jurisdiction-stripping 
statutes under the Exceptions Clause. To the extent that the 
harmful impact on litigants of a jurisdiction stripping statute is 
greater than that of a recusal statute, there is even less reason 
for the Court to overturn the latter. 
Because the Court cannot remedy its impasse with Congress 
without doing precisely the damage to its institutional reputation 
and legitimacy that proponents of recusal reform seek to avoid, 
the task lies with Congress to employ the non-legislative tools at 
its disposal to alleviate the interbranch tension over recusal. 
IV. Congress as an Effective Constitutional Actor 
The fact that regulatory approaches to Supreme Court 
recusal raise constitutional concerns about the bounds of 
congressional authority does not mean that Congress is without 
potentially effective methods to remedy its impasse with the 
Court. By viewing the question of Supreme Court recusal as a 
matter of constitutional structure, we can more clearly identify 
ways that Congress may legitimately exercise its non-regulatory 
authority to address concerns over the Justices’ recusal practices 
without the countervailing harm to judicial and congressional 
legitimacy that results from regulatory intervention. 
A. Congress’s Indirect Constitutional Tools 
This analysis reveals five indirect constitutional approaches 
for Congress to use in influencing Supreme Court recusal practice 
within the confines of a legitimate tripartite governmental 
structure—impeachment, procedural reform, judicial confirmation, 
appropriations, and investigation. 
1. Impeachment 
Congress’s impeachment power is perhaps its strongest 
means of curtailing perceived recusal abuses by the Justices. The 
benefits of impeachment in the Supreme Court recusal context 
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are its clear constitutional legitimacy as a legislative check on the 
Judiciary and its effectiveness, both as a response to past recusal 
misconduct and as a deterrent against future misconduct by the 
Justices. First, impeachment is a valuable tool for Congress in 
the recusal context because it is clear as a constitutional matter. 
In fact, questions of impeachment are best understood as political 
questions, dedicated exclusively to the Legislature by Article I.183 
Unlike direct regulatory limits on Supreme Court recusal, 
impeachment is not a separation of powers problem, but rather 
an anticipated and explicitly prescribed potential solution. 
Impeachment is also attractive because of the nature of the 
remedy; by removing a Justice from office, any future problems 
with that Justice’s recusal practices will be alleviated. It likewise 
stands to reason that the specter of impeachment will work as a 
deterrent, encouraging Justices to conform their recusal practices 
to those norms not considered impeachable by Congress.  
Impeachment’s primary shortcoming in the recusal context is 
its lack of constitutionally mandated criteria. The converse of 
impeachment’s strong claim to legitimacy as a legislative check 
on the Judiciary as an institution is the potential legitimacy 
problem arising from a specific exercise of the impeachment 
power over an individual Justice. Article III guarantees the 
Justices their “Offices during good Behavior,”184 but that term is 
otherwise undefined in the constitutional text, and Article I 
provides little or no guidance as to how or when impeachment 
proceedings should be instituted.185 Impeachment proceedings 
against a Justice for any reason, including recusal issues, would 
require significant explanation by Congress to avoid the public 
perception of overreaching and to avoid the risk of lowering the 
bar for the impeachment of federal judges, especially Supreme 
Court Justices, to the detriment of the Judiciary’s ability to 
function as a coequal branch of government. These dangers, 
however, while significant, are neither unique to Congress’s 
                                                                                                     
 183. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) (holding that challenges to 
the impeachment process are non-justiciable political questions).   
 184. U.S. CONST. art III, § 1. 
 185.  One feature of impeachment proceedings that is clear from the 
constitutional text is that they must initiate in the House. See id. 
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exercise of the impeachment power nor fatal to impeachment’s 
potential usefulness for recusal. Arbitrariness and overuse are no 
more present in impeachment than in any other largely 
discretionary exercise of authority under the Constitution. The 
power to declare war, for example, does not come with any easily 
cognizable objective legal standards limiting its application; it is 
a political decision by a political branch that is checked only by 
electoral and political processes.186 The President’s veto power is 
a similarly discretionary act that is checked not by constitutional 
restraints on the exercise of that power, but by political and 
electoral checks on the President.187 Impeachment enjoys similar 
political limitations, as well as the additional constraint of 
requiring two separate and coordinated efforts by both Houses of 
Congress.188 By dividing the power of removal through 
impeachment between the two Houses, impeachment is better 
protected from abuse and overuse than other discretionary 
constitutional acts. Finally, the lack of demonstrable standards 
does not make impeachment impossible to employ as a productive 
and valuable, even if rarely used, tool for influencing Supreme 
Court recusal. Federal judicial impeachment has rarely been used 
by past Legislatures.189 There is no reason to believe that future 
Congresses will have difficulty deciding how impeachment may 
be used to affect the Justices’ recusal decisions without unduly 
damaging itself, the Court, or the separation of powers more 
generally. In fact, the severity of the impeachment remedy may 
cause it to be used even more sparingly. In short, because 
impeachment is constitutionally dedicated to Congress and holds 
substantial promise as an effective (if rarely used) remedy, it 
remains a viable tool for congressional involvement in the debate 
over Supreme Court recusal. 
                                                                                                     
 186. See id. art I, § 8, cl. 11 (giving Congress the power “[t]o declare [w]ar”). 
 187. See id. art I, § 7. The possibility of a congressional override is of course 
a check on the effectiveness of the President’s veto power, but not on his 
constitutional authority to choose to issue the veto in the first instance. 
 188. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 2, cl.5; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
 189. See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND 
REMOVAL 29–30 (1993) (noting that since the Founding, only eleven judges have 
been tried in impeachment proceedings, and only seven have been convicted). 
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2. Procedural Reform 
A second example of congressional authority over the 
Justices’ recusal practices lies in Congress’s authority to 
promulgate procedural requirements for the federal courts. The 
operative word in this category is procedural in light of the 
working assumption that the separation of powers precludes 
direct congressional regulation of the Justices’ substantive 
recusal decisions. With that caveat in mind, there are several 
ways in which Congress could seek to regulate Supreme Court 
procedure. The first is through the Exceptions Clause of Article 
III. The Exceptions Clause could be used by Congress to regulate 
or “strip” appellate jurisdiction from the Court in cases in which, 
for instance, a certain number of recusals occurred, or conversely 
in which a certain number of recusal motions were denied. The 
Exceptions Clause could thereby serve as an incentive to 
encourage or discourage recusals, as Justices would 
presumptively be less likely to recuse when doing so would 
imperil the Court’s jurisdiction over a case, and more likely to do 
so when it would not.190 Nevertheless, although theoretically 
straightforward under Article III, use of the Exceptions Clause is 
not uncontroversial, especially when, as in the above recusal 
examples, it could effectively eviscerate the Court’s otherwise 
valid appellate jurisdiction. The Court’s Exceptions Clause 
jurisprudence has never upheld a statute that has the effect of 
closing off Supreme Court review altogether, and there are 
potential separation of powers problems associated with Congress 
taking that step.191 Moreover, stripping jurisdiction in reaction to 
the denial of motions to recuse could incentivize meritless recusal 
motions by litigants who were successful below. An additional 
requirement aimed to remedy this problem, for instance counting 
                                                                                                     
 190. The precise opposite motivations could also be true, namely when a 
Justice who is not enamored of a case could base their recusal decision at least 
in part on how that decision would affect the case’s viability, but I think this is a 
far less likely scenario, especially when the alternative is to vote on the merits 
of the case. 
 191. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 3.2, at 182 (5th 
ed. 2007) (explaining that congressional attempts to limit the Court’s appellate 
jurisdiction have “never . . . been interpreted as precluding all Supreme Court 
review”). 
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only nonfrivolous motions to recuse in the jurisdictional analysis, 
highlights another problem with the use of the Exceptions Clause 
to influence recusal at the Court—the ultimate unenforceability 
of the standards. As long as the Court remains the final word on 
the Exceptions Clause, and there is no constitutional basis to 
conclude that it would not, Congress’s authority to limit the 
Court’s appellate jurisdiction remains dependent on the Court’s 
own reading of the Clause. While the Court would not lightly 
strike such a statute,192 it may attempt to protect some measure 
of its own authority (and litigants’ access to it) through the same 
statutory interpretation and constitutional line-drawing 
techniques it has employed in prior Exceptions Clause cases.193 
Finally, the Exceptions Clause is under-inclusive in the recusal 
context because it cannot reach cases involving the Court’s 
original jurisdiction. 
One possible counter to the Exceptions Clause’s under-
inclusiveness is Congress’s power over the Court’s quorum 
requirements. Quorum standards are not limited to cases arising 
under the Court’s appellate jurisdiction. They also do not 
necessarily pose a separation of powers problem.194 Quorum 
values could be used to either encourage or discourage recusals. A 
high quorum requirement would likely encourage participation 
                                                                                                     
 192. See discussion supra Part III.C (discussing the importance of inter-
branch comity and cooperation to the constitutional separation of powers). 
 193. See, e.g., Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868) (interpreting a 
jurisdiction-stripping statute to still permit appellate review on alternative 
statutory grounds); Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1868) (employing the 
alternate basis for appellate jurisdiction suggested in McCardle). 
 194. Quorum standards are less likely to create separation of powers 
problems when they do not set minimum participation requirements for the 
Justices that are unattainable, either due to the number of Justices currently 
sitting on the Court, or the total number of Justices authorized to serve. For 
example, quorum requirements almost certainly would create a separation of 
powers problem if they set the minimum number of Justices required to decide a 
case as higher than the total number of Justices authorized to sit on the Court 
(envision a quorum requirement of 10 on the present Court). A similar problem 
would arise if the quorum number was greater than the number of Justices 
available to serve at any one time, due to an unfilled vacancy or a prolonged 
absence. In those instances, I would argue that Congress has a constitutional 
duty to either lower the quorum requirements or to fill the existing vacancies by 
confirming additional Justices in order to honor the Article III requirement that 
there be “one supreme Court.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
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and a lower number could decrease the perceived cost of a 
Justice’s decision to recuse. While they are limited by the fact 
that the substantive decision to recuse is ultimately left to the 
Justices themselves, and as such permits easy circumvention of 
any quorum requirements,195 the absence of regulatory recusal 
standards at minimum makes the Justices accountable for a 
decision to circumvent quorum in a way they were not under a 
regulatory recusal regime.  
Finally, Congress could require that the Justices follow 
specific procedural steps in making and issuing their recusal 
decisions under its traditional, inherent power to regulate the 
procedures of the federal courts.196 Procedural reforms, like a 
requirement that the Justices publish explanations of their 
recusal decisions, or that those decisions be subject to review by 
the entire Court, are popular among reformers concerned about 
the public perception and legitimacy of the Court,197 and 
admittedly are less susceptible to constitutional arguments 
invoking the separation of powers than substantive recusal 
requirements.198 This does not, however, mean that procedural 
requirements are without limitations. The suggested procedural 
reforms are not only ultimately unenforceable against the 
Justices, but their anticipated benefits may also be diminished by 
the absence of parallel substantive reforms.199 If the Court is 
                                                                                                     
 195. This is precisely what happened in North American Co. v. SEC, 327 
U.S. 686 (1946). Chief Justice Stone originally recused himself from the case, 
only to reverse his decision and participate when he realized his recusal could 
defeat a quorum. 
 196. This authority could also be grounded in the Necessary and Proper 
Clause of Article I, Section 8, but, for these purposes, the precise constitutional 
basis is unimportant. It is adequate for the present discussion to acknowledge 
that Congress retains constitutional authority to influence—at least to some 
degree—the procedures of the federal courts, including the Supreme Court.  
 197. See discussion supra notes 49–56 and accompanying text (discussing 
the criticism of current Supreme Court recusal practices and the suggestions for 
various types of reform).  
 198. See Virelli, supra note 11, at 1223–25 (discussing potential methods of 
procedural recusal reform). 
 199. To the extent supporters of statutory procedural recusal reform value 
the potential symbolic or persuasive effects of those reforms on the Supreme 
Court, any such benefit is arguably outweighed by the costs of creating a 
seemingly irresolvable conflict between two Branches of government. 
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constitutionally protected from congressional interference in 
deciding whether a Justice will ultimately be recused from a case, 
the procedural framework in which that decision is made is not 
likely to shed significantly more light on that decision. For 
example, requirements that Justices publish their reasons for 
failing to recuse themselves could, in the absence of defined, 
binding criteria for recusal decisions, do little to promote the 
integrity or public perception of the Court because there will be 
no baseline against which to measure the quality of the Justice’s 
explanations. It is also difficult to imagine how, in cases where a 
Justice would not voluntarily choose to publicly explain their 
decision, an unenforceable reporting requirement would result in 
anything more than a cursory statement by the Justice. A similar 
problem arises if the procedural requirement consists of the full 
Court reviewing an individual decision of one of its members. As 
evidenced by the fact that only once in its history has the Court 
experienced a public dispute between its members over recusal,200 
it is unlikely that internal Court review of its members’ recusal 
decisions would lead to any useful insight into either the decision 
under review or the Court’s feelings about recusal more broadly. 
Nevertheless, even if procedural reforms do not drastically 
change the outcome of individual recusal decisions, they can 
serve to increase the transparency of the process by either 
increasing the amount of substantive information provided by the 
Justices in their recusal decisions, or, at minimum, shifting 
responsibility for providing that information (and thus blame for 
not providing it) from Congress to the Justices. 
Procedural reform is an example of an indirect constitutional 
tool that is far greater than the sum of its parts. Despite the 
limitations of each of the proposed reforms, the impact of 
procedural reform in general offers potentially significant 
benefits in terms of transparency and accountability, both of 
which could enhance the Court’s public perception and legitimacy 
                                                                                                     
 200. See Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, United Mine Workers, 
325 U.S. 897, 897 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“There is no authority known 
to me under which a majority of this Court has power under any circumstances 
to exclude one of its duly commissioned Justices from sitting or voting in any 
case.”). 
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without the expense of the constitutional impasse created by 
direct congressional regulation of recusal standards. 
3. Judicial Confirmation 
The Senate’s power over judicial confirmations is another 
means by which Congress can influence Supreme Court recusal. 
Unlike its legislative authority, which is limited by Article I as 
well as competing constitutional provisions, the Senate’s power to 
confirm is seemingly unconstrained as a constitutional matter.201 
Moreover, Supreme Court confirmation hearings have become 
increasingly detailed and substantive. As Professors Lori 
Ringhand and Paul Collins demonstrated in their exhaustive 
empirical study of the last seven decades of Supreme Court 
confirmation hearings, “it is evident there was a steady increase 
in the amount of dialogue that transpires at the hearings” since 
1939, and “substantive issues . . . have long dominated the 
hearings.”202 There is also no reason to believe that Senators’ 
questions regarding a nominee’s views on recusal would not be 
answered. Although many of the Senators’ inquiries about 
specific and controversial areas of the law are met with generic 
and noncommittal responses by the nominee in order to avoid 
appearing as if they have prejudged issues that could come before 
the Court, questions about a potential Justice’s views on judicial 
recusal would be largely immune from such an objection. Recusal 
questions are technically not the subject of cases before the 
Court, as they are committed entirely to an individual Justice’s 
judgment. They are more akin to questions about judicial 
philosophy, which is a popular topic at confirmation hearings203 
                                                                                                     
 201. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (stating only that the President “shall 
nominate, with the Advice and Consent of the Senate . . . Judges of the Supreme 
Court”). 
 202. Lori A. Ringhand & Paul M. Collins, Jr., May It Please the Senate: An 
Empirical Analysis of the Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings of Supreme 
Court Nominees, 1939-2009, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 589, 632–33 (2011). 
 203. See id. at 617–18 (“Judicial philosophy is the third most frequently 
occurring issue following chatter and civil rights. Comments about judicial 
philosophy, which include such things as discussions of constitutional 
interpretation, stare decisis and judicial activism, constitute 12.4% of the 
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and has not been treated as objectionable by the nominees; in 
fact, Chief Justice Roberts’s most memorable statement from his 
own confirmation hearing explained his jurisprudential 
philosophy by analogizing judges to baseball umpires.204 In light 
of the Chief Justice’s Year-End Report, it is clear that the Court 
is equivocal about which, if any, specific standards govern their 
recusal decisions. Without attempting to impose binding legal 
requirements on those decisions—something I have argued here 
and elsewhere would violate the separation of powers205—the 
Senate could exercise its unbounded discretion over confirmation 
to screen Supreme Court candidates based on their views of 
Supreme Court ethics and recusal. This approach is admittedly 
limited, as a candidate’s views on recusal may not be sufficient to 
deny their confirmation, and questioning a nominee about recusal 
would not have any legal effect on a Justice post-confirmation. 
Nevertheless, by focusing at least in part on recusal at a 
nominee’s confirmation hearing, the Senate could encourage both 
the nominees and the public to more closely examine the recusal 
issue in a way that could create pressure on the new Justice to 
comport with the views expressed at their confirmation hearing. 
4. Appropriations 
Congress’s power of the purse is yet another potentially 
useful means of legislative influence over the Court’s recusal 
practices. Like many of the other indirect methods mentioned, 
Congress’s appropriations power has the benefit of a clear 
constitutional pedigree; there is no question that the ultimate 
authority to provide funding for the coordinate Branches lies 
squarely and solely with Congress.206 Appropriations are also a 
                                                                                                     
comments in the dataset.”). 
 204. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. To 
Be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (“Judges are like umpires. Umpires don’t make 
the rules, they apply them. The role of the umpire and a judge is critical. They 
make sure everyone plays by the rules, but it is a limited role.”). 
 205. See generally Virelli, supra note 11 (stating that separation of powers 
principles prevent Congress from directly regulating Supreme Court recusal). 
 206. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (“No Money shall be drawn from the 
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powerful source of leverage over the other Branches. Finally, 
because appropriations are inherently focused on the Court as an 
institution, rather than the individual Justices, Congress’s power 
of the purse could be an effective way to encourage the Court to 
adopt its own recusal reforms.207 
There are, however, limitations on any congressional attempt 
to influence Supreme Court recusal through appropriations. 
Although the institutional focus of appropriations may serve as a 
benefit in attempting to change the recusal practices of the Court 
as a whole, appropriations are not a good way for Congress to try 
and address an individual Justice’s recusal practices. 
Appropriations are also limited by the fact that they do not 
address the Court’s recusal practices directly; they are a source of 
pressure designed to incentivize the Justices to change their 
behavior in exchange for funding that likely has little or nothing 
to do with that behavior. While this is not a weakness in terms of 
the relevance or availability of appropriations as a source of 
legislative influence, it does render the power of the purse 
inferior to other approaches such as procedural reforms and even 
investigations that are able to target and potentially change 
specific recusal practices directly. Moreover, in the event 
Congress chose to rely heavily on its appropriations power to 
influence the Justices’ recusal practices, additional problems 
could arise. A decision to withhold funding in order to affect 
recusal could have serious consequences for the Court’s ability to 
perform its constitutionally-assigned judicial function. At the 
extreme, a deprivation of funding could impair the Court so 
severely as to threaten the Article III requirement that there be 
“one supreme Court.”208 Notwithstanding these limits, Congress’s 
power of the purse is another constitutionally-recognized tool by 
which Congress may influence the Justices’ conduct, and as such 
is a potentially useful feature in the process of reformulating the 
balance of power between Congress and the Court over recusal. 
                                                                                                     
Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law . . . .”). 
 207. This would be perhaps the best of all possible outcomes, as a decision 
by the Justices to voluntarily adopt clearer and more transparent recusal 
practices could promote the legitimacy of the Court without disrupting the 
balance of powers between the Court and Congress. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 208. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
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5. Investigation 
Finally, Congress can use its general investigatory power209 
to investigate and, more specifically, conduct public hearings on 
issues of national importance. In light of the constitutional and 
practical realities of Supreme Court recusal, any lasting, effective 
institution-wide reform will ultimately be up to the Justices 
themselves. One way for Congress to instigate such reform is to 
bring additional public awareness and pressure to bear on the 
Justices such that they reevaluate their own recusal practices.210 
Congress’s investigatory authority is broad, and includes the 
ability to question members of the Court regarding recusal.211 
Congress began to explore this approach in 2011, as Justices were 
asked to testify before Congress on two separate occasions about 
                                                                                                     
 209. This reference to “general investigatory power” is meant to contrast the 
exercise of congressional power being discussed here with the power to 
investigate incident to impeachment proceedings. Investigations relating to an 
impeachment are part of the broader discussion of impeachment and recusal 
included supra at notes 127–32 and accompanying text. 
 210. This is not to suggest that Congress should employ the full weight of its 
investigatory authority—such as its subpoena power—on the Justices, as this 
would implement questions of interbranch coordination and comity that may 
themselves run afoul of the separation of powers. The investigative authority 
contemplated in this section is akin to an ongoing confirmation hearing, 
whereby Congress may enhance the public’s awareness and knowledge of the 
Supreme Court’s recusal practices as a way of encouraging the Justices to 
remain vigilant in thinking about and evaluating their recusal practices. 
 211. See, e.g., William P. Marshall, The Limits On Congress's Authority to 
Investigate the President, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 781, 785 (“Although there is no 
explicit textual grant of investigative power to Congress in the Constitution, the 
proposition that a legislative body generally possesses investigative powers is 
not controversial as a historical matter.”); Todd David Peterson, Congressional 
Investigations of Federal Judges, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1, 11 (2004)  
As with the testimony concerning court administration, testimony by 
federal judges on policy matters directly affecting the court (as long 
as it does not morph into an investigation of the judge) seems not only 
to be non-problematic, but also to be essential to the preservation of 
good relations between the legislative and judicial branches, and 
important for the protection of the interests of the federal courts. 
See also Fisher, supra note 154, at 160 (“Congress uses its investigative power to 
satisfy four main purposes: to enact legislation, to oversee the administration of 
programs, to inform the public, and to protect its integrity, dignity, reputation 
and privileges.”). 
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ethical and recusal practices at the Court.212 Following those 
public appearances, and in conjunction with public pressure from 
academics and the media to consider reform,213 Chief Justice 
Roberts chose to dedicate nearly all of his Year-End Report to 
ethical issues, including recusal. Although it is impossible to 
draw a definite causal link between the increased attention to the 
Justices’ recusal practices and the Chief Justice’s decision to 
publicly address those practices in his annual report, at least 
some connection between the two is easy to imagine. It is rational 
to assume that the Court would take seriously the feelings of a 
coordinate branch, especially when those feelings are 
corroborated by public opinion and advocacy organizations.214 
This assumption is supported by the fact that the first public 
statement by the Court regarding recusal since 1993 occurred in 
the wake of just this type of congressional and public pressure. 
Prohibiting Congress from directly regulating the Justices’ 
recusal decisions does not render it constitutionally helpless in 
influencing those decisions. Congress may exercise its largely 
unfettered constitutional discretion to impeach, fashion 
procedural standards, confirm judicial nominees, appropriate 
funds, and investigate in order to protect against recusal 
decisions that imperil the public’s perception of the Court and its 
institutional legitimacy. Although each of these indirect 
constitutional approaches is limited in its scope and potential 
effectiveness with regard to individual recusal decisions, 
collectively these approaches have the opportunity to create some 
                                                                                                     
 212. Justices Breyer and Kennedy were asked about Supreme Court ethics 
and recusal standards as part of their testimony before a House subcommittee 
on April 14, 2011. See Malloy, supra note 5, at 2389. Additionally, on October 5, 
2011, Justices Breyer and Scalia testified about the same topic before the 
Senate Judiciary Committee. See Considering the Role of Judges under the 
Constitution of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 112th 
Cong. (2011). 
 213. See supra notes 2–10 and accompanying text (outlining the public 
media and academic scrutiny brought to bear on the recusal question in 2011). 
 214. The Alliance for Justice recently circulated a request for signatures for 
a letter requesting the Court to take up ethical reforms on its own. See Alliance 
for Justice, Supreme Court Ethics Reform, http://www.afj.org/connect-with-the-
issues/supreme-court-ethics-reform/judicial-ethics-prof-letter-scotus.html (last 
visited Sept. 18, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
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normative benefits that are potentially lost in the current 
impasse between Congress and the Court over recusal. 
B. Political and Institutional Benefits 
There are two broad categories of benefits that accrue from 
shifting the conversation about Supreme Court recusal to a 
constitutional framework. The first are systemic benefits, benefits 
that adhere to the effectiveness of our entire tripartite system by 
promoting the constitutional legitimacy and reputation of the 
Court. The second are institutional benefits, which include the 
substantive benefits to both litigants and the Court that arise 
from the Justices retaining (at least direct) control over their own 
recusal decisions.215 Rather than encouraging Congress to engage 
in unenforceable and unconstitutional direct regulation of the 
Justices’ recusal practices that has little if any transformative 
effect on those practices, a constitutional lens highlights the other 
options available to release the interbranch tension over recusal 
and to create a new dynamic between the Court and Congress 
(and ultimately the public) that is both constitutionally sound 
and effective. The result is more and better opportunities for 
lasting solutions to the impasse over recusal at the Court. 
1. Systemic Benefits 
The impasse over Supreme Court recusal reflects badly on 
the Justices and draws into question the constitutional legitimacy 
of all of their decisions, including recusal decisions. The ongoing 
tension facilitated by the Court’s failure to comply with an 
unenforceable congressional mandate creates a sense of 
arbitrariness and overreaching on behalf of the Justices, 
regardless of whether their decisions are in fact legitimate or 
                                                                                                     
 215. As discussed in this section as well as in supra Part IV.A, Congress has 
a series of constitutional mechanisms at its disposal to influence the Court’s 
recusal decisions. Nothing in this discussion of the benefits associated with the 
Justices’ control over those decisions is meant to diminish or otherwise overlook 
Congress’s authority in that regard. The benefits argued for here are understood 
to exist alongside congressional use of its own constitutional influence. 
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constitutional.216 Part of this problem stems from the fact that the 
Court, as the regulated entity, is also the final word in applying 
the recusal statute. Short of reading the recusal statute to create 
a strong presumption in favor of recusal, a position that would 
raise other constitutional problems,217 the Court invites criticism 
that it is acting in a self-serving or aggrandizing manner simply 
by virtue of its fulfilling its role as the governmental entity 
ultimately responsible for deciding “what the law is.”218 Assigning 
constitutional responsibility for alleviating the impasse over 
recusal to Congress helps avoid the problems of legitimacy for the 
Court that come both from an irresolvable dispute with Congress 
over recusal as well as an attempt by the Court to resolve such a 
dispute in its own favor. 
In addition to enhancing the Supreme Court’s reputation and 
legitimacy, relief from the interbranch tension over recusal could 
refocus Congress on more constitutionally defensible and 
appropriate activities regarding recusal. Congress’s pursuit of 
indirect constitutional mechanisms represents a more effective 
and cooperative use of our constitutional structure to resolve 
difficult problems, and as such offers the public an example of its 
federal government at work that makes sense within the 
constitutional framework. The broader range of constitutional 
tools at Congress’s disposal are well-suited to raise public 
awareness about recusal and put the Justices on notice that their 
recusal decisions—and as a result the institutional legitimacy of 
                                                                                                     
 216. One could argue that a reciprocal perception problem adheres for 
Congress; that the ineffectiveness of the recusal statute makes Congress appear 
ineffectual. While this is true in theory, I would suggest that the appearance of 
arbitrariness or overreaching is far more damaging to the public perception of a 
democratic institution than the perception that it is unable to enforce its own 
positions, especially when the failure to enforce is due to the apparent obstinacy 
of a coequal branch. As a result, the public perception problem created by the 
impasse over recusal is depicted here as solely a judicial problem not because 
there is no countervailing negative repercussions for Congress, but because 
those repercussions are less severe and in some ways derivative of the problems 
created for the Court. 
 217. See discussion supra Part III.B (discussing the constitutional limits on 
congressional regulation of Supreme Court recusal). See generally Virelli, supra 
note 11 (stating that separation of powers principles prevent Congress from 
directly regulating Supreme Court recusal). 
 218. Marbury v. Madison, 1 U.S. (Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
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the Court in general—will be subject to greater public scrutiny. 
Confirmation hearings can work to create cultural change about 
recusal at the Court as well as put individual Justices on specific 
notice about what Congress and the public expect in terms of 
fairness and consistency from the Justices. Congressional 
investigations and hearings can also raise public awareness and 
communicate clear messages to the Court as a whole about 
recusal, which in turn may serve as incentives for internal 
recusal reform. Appropriations offer further incentives for 
internal recusal reform at the Court and provide a potentially 
valuable opportunity for Congress and the Court to cooperate in 
the best spirit of the separation of powers. The specter of 
impeachment is an unlikely but powerful deterrent against the 
Justices overreaching to hear cases that Congress and the public 
consider them unfit to decide, and jurisdictional limitations and 
procedural reforms are potentially useful ways to maintain some 
additional checks on the Justices’ conduct. Even if these 
mechanisms are rarely utilized, a shift by Congress to focus on 
these measures creates a public image of an orderly and effective 
system of checks and balances, rather than the unrestrained 
exercise of personal judgment by unelected Justices. 
Recognition of the proper division of constitutional 
responsibility over recusal also promotes legitimacy by signaling 
public trust in the integrity and professionalism of the Court. 
This signal is valuable for at least two reasons. First, it is 
factually accurate, at least in the majority of cases. Although 
ethics and recusal at the Court have become a hotly discussed 
issue, even the strongest critics of the Court’s practices concede 
that in the overwhelming majority of instances in which recusal 
decisions are required, the Justices either get it right or make 
responsible decisions.219  
                                                                                                     
 219. See Stempel, supra note 32, at 642  
To be fair, the low use and success rate of recusal motions probably 
stems in large part from the Justices’ ability to stop a lurking conflict 
of interest and voluntarily remove themselves from questionable 
cases. . . . Indeed, because of this strong informal tradition of stepping 
aside where appropriate without being asked, the custom of counsel 
has been to refrain from seeking recusal by motion . . . . 
See also McElroy & Dorf, supra note 60, at 99 (explaining that “Justices would 
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Second, it facilitates a sense of interbranch comity and 
respect that is essential to the integrity of a tripartite 
government.220 Under the current arrangement, Congress 
appears to be calling into question the legitimacy of the Court 
without either the imprimatur of a binding legal standard to 
initiate change or a means of addressing the unique institutional 
concerns associated with Supreme Court recusal. Expressly 
acknowledging the constitutional reality that the Court may, at 
minimum, exercise significant discretion in its recusal decisions 
promotes public understanding of, and confidence in, the 
separation of powers. This argument is made even more powerful 
by the fact that the benefit is available virtually free of cost. As it 
currently stands, Supreme Court recusal decisions are entirely 
dependent on the Justices’ individual judgment and integrity.221 
Acknowledgment that the Court is the sole arbiter of its own 
recusal questions (subject only to those constitutional checks 
clearly assigned to Congress) could serve as a powerful 
endorsement of the Court’s competence and integrity without 
requiring that Congress relinquish any actual authority.  
Finally, judicial procedure generally, and recusal decisions in 
particular, are squarely within the expertise of the Judiciary. 
Congressional acknowledgement of the Court’s greater expertise 
further inspires public confidence in the Court and properly 
draws focus on the Legislature’s constitutionally assigned 
prerogatives for curtailing judicial power. 
2. Institutional Benefits 
Just as alleviating the impasse over recusal at the Court will 
have systemic benefits for the overall efficacy and legitimacy of 
our constitutional democracy, it may also present potential 
advantages for both individual litigants and the Court. Perhaps 
                                                                                                     
almost certainly recuse themselves in clear-cut conflict situations”). 
 220. See Paulsen, supra note 93, at 228–29 (describing the importance of 
“coordinacy” among the Branches). 
 221. See Stempel, supra note 32, at 642 (“Supreme Court recusal practice 
provides an almost unique illustration in American government of substantive 
law without force when applied to a certain institution.”). 
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the most obvious of these advantages is that a congressional 
decision to focus on indirect constitutional influences and 
formally commit substantive recusal decisions exclusively to the 
Justices most accurately describes current and historic 
constitutional practice. This is significant because it eliminates 
any distortive effects from the current statutory regime. Under 
the existing statutory standards, Congress provides the Court 
with unenforceable statutory “cover” for its recusal decisions. 
This discourages transparency and accountability among the 
Justices, as they are free to explain their recusal decisions in the 
context of the statutory standard when there is little reason to 
believe they feel bound by or accountable to that standard; 
although they generally cite to the governing statute when 
discussing recusal, in practice the Justices seem content to rely 
on extrastatutory sources and arguments to support their 
conclusions.222 The statute thus provides a veil of legality over 
what is, in actuality, a constitutionally assigned judicial policy 
decision about whether to recuse. By lifting the statutory veil 
from the Court’s recusal practices, each Justice’s recusal 
decisions can be properly understood and attributed to them as 
their own analysis of what is in the best interests of justice in 
that case. While this may not necessarily lead to more satisfying 
results in specific cases, it will more accurately focus public 
attention on the correct target in evaluating the Court’s recusal 
jurisprudence. This increased transparency and accountability 
among the individual Justices could in turn promote internal 
reform by encouraging the Justices to reexamine their views on 
the proper role of recusal for themselves and the Court as an 
institution. 
In addition to promoting transparency in the Court’s recusal 
jurisprudence, there are reasons to believe that Congress could 
promote better substantive recusal practices by accepting its 
proper constitutional role and foregoing attempts to directly 
regulate recusal at the Court. First, stepping aside could open up 
space for the Court to take greater responsibility for the recusal 
                                                                                                     
 222. See discussion supra notes 111–20 and accompanying text (describing 
the recusal analyses proffered by then-Justice Rehnquist in Laird and Justice 
Scalia in Cheney). 
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issue and be more creative in seeking its own responses to public 
and governmental criticism.223 Although it is unlikely, especially 
in light of recent events,224 that the Court would adopt sweeping 
formal reforms of its recusal practices, heightened public 
awareness of the issue, coupled with the absence of a statutory 
standard, may push the Justices toward more frequent 
explanation of their recusal decisions or more serious 
consideration of recusal questions in certain circumstances. An 
incentive to engage in voluntary recusal reform may be the best 
possible solution to the public discontent over Supreme Court 
recusal, as it incorporates recusal reform without threatening the 
balance of power between Congress and the Court.  
Another outcome that seeks to achieve this balance and is 
made more likely by Congress refraining from direct regulation of 
recusal at the Court is the reintroduction of the Due Process 
Clause into the discussion of Supreme Court recusal. Although 
the separation of powers may reserve authority over recusal to 
the Court alone, it does nothing to limit the scope of the Court’s 
authority over its own recusal practices or to insulate the Justices 
from the constitutional requirements of fairness, dignity, and 
personal liberty embodied in the concept of due process.225 
Moreover, because due process is a constitutionally mandated 
individual right, it is uncontroversial as a separation of powers 
matter because it is precisely the sort of standard that the Court 
is qualified to apply and constitutionally bound to uphold. 
                                                                                                     
 223. A recent campaign from Alliance for Justice, a prominent public 
interest group concerned with judicial ethics, took precisely this approach in an 
open letter to the Court urging that the Justices voluntarily adopt recusal 
reform without congressional involvement. See Letter from Twelve Reform 
Organizations to the Supreme Court (Jan. 9, 2012), available at 
http://www.afj.org/connect-with-the-issues/supreme-court-ethics-reform/coalition-
letter-to-chief-justice-roberts.pdf. 
 224. See 2011 YEAR-END REPORT, supra note 3 (explaining why Supreme 
Court Justices must exercise their own independent judgment in making 
recusal decisions); Chief Justice Letter, supra note 13 (“[F]or the reasons 
explained in my year-end report, the Court does not plan to adopt the Code of 
Conduct for United States Judges.”). 
 225. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) 
(describing the concept of due process as “the balance which our Nation, built 
upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck between 
that liberty and the demands of organized society”). 
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Finally, the elimination of direct congressional influence over the 
recusal process leaves that process with the Court. By virtue of 
their experience and training alone, the Justices possess greater 
institutional competence than Congress in fashioning effective 
recusal standards. 
In sum, treating Supreme Court recusal as a constitutional 
question governed by the principle of separation of powers offers 
significant systemic and institutional benefits. It promotes public 
confidence in the Court as well as transparency and 
accountability among the Justices by shaping the legal 
framework to better reflect constitutional practice. It also has 
potential to improve the Justices’ decision making in the area by 
incentivizing them to consider their own recusal practices and to 
incorporate standards that are squarely within the Court’s 
institutional expertise and responsibility. 
V. Conclusion 
Recusal has come to dominate current conversations about the 
Court because it implicates the most foundational features of 
Supreme Court jurisprudence—fairness, legitimacy, transparency, 
and the proper scope and exercise of governmental power. 
Nevertheless, the debate over recusal has so far been framed 
almost exclusively as a matter of judicial ethics. This Article is 
the second part of an effort to reexamine the recusal issue 
through a constitutional lens in order to better illustrate how 
structural principles like the separation of powers are necessary 
to help us more fully understand the consequences of the Justices’ 
recusal decisions and the dynamics of tripartite government more 
broadly. In an earlier treatment of recusal at the Court, I argued 
that statutory recusal standards are inconsistent with the 
principle of separation of powers because they unduly infringe on 
the Court’s inherent judicial power under Article III of the 
Constitution. The present analysis takes this 
constitutionalization of the recusal debate a step further, asking 
how the separation of powers can help us reach a constitutionally 
acceptable and effective resolution of the ongoing impasse 
between Congress and the Court over recusal.  
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The answer can be found at the intersection of Congress’s 
status as a constitutional interpreter and all three Branches’ 
responsibility to promote interbranch coordination and comity in 
a tripartite constitutional regime. When the Supreme Court is at 
odds with a coequal branch of government, as in the recusal 
context, the separation of powers suggests that the Court should 
not take it upon itself to resolve the dispute, especially if the 
better constitutional argument favors the Justices. It is precisely 
in this scenario when Congress must be called on to take up the 
interpretive mantle and correct the constitutional impasse in a 
way that best promotes effective government. In the context of 
recusal, this calls for Congress to cease regulating the Justices’ 
recusal practices directly, and instead to employ its indirect 
constitutional tools such as impeachment, procedural reform, 
judicial confirmation, appropriations, and investigation to 
influence the Court’s recusal decisions.  
Perhaps more importantly, this application of the separation 
of powers to the interbranch impasse over recusal offers broader 
insights into the best way to think about constitutional conflicts 
between the Court and its coordinate Branches going forward. By 
considering the role of the Court in its conflict with Congress over 
recusal, we are better able to understand which structural 
principles can be used to alleviate interbranch tension and diffuse 
potential crises of institutional legitimacy. The instant analysis 
also highlights a series of critical questions regarding 
constitutional structure and dynamics for future research, such 
as: Should democratic legitimacy always be the guiding principle 
in resolving interbranch disputes? What is each branch’s 
institutional responsibility in resolving those disputes? Do those 
responsibilities change when a branch is a party to the dispute, or 
are they a function of institutional competency and constitutional 
authority? Under what circumstances should a coordinate branch 
feel comfortable asserting its own interests against another 
branch? Does it matter if those interests are legal or political? 
What constitutional mechanisms are best suited to provide 
resolutions? The constitutional lessons learned from Supreme 
Court recusal serve as a template for addressing these bigger 
questions about the boundaries of constitutional power and the 
role of each of the coordinate Branches in facilitating our 
constitutional democracy. 
